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“The sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship is being destroyed by
federal bureaucrats, who have turned the drug war into a war on pain relief.
Americans suffering from chronic pain and their doctors are the real victims
of this unprincipled and medically unsound federal campaign.”
Rep. Ron Paul, M.D.1
“‘[P]hysicians are particularly easily deterred by the threat of
governmental investigation and/or sanction from engaging in conduct that is
entirely lawful and medically appropriate. . . . [A] physician’s practice is
particularly dependent upon the physician’s maintaining a reputation of
unimpeachable integrity. A physician’s career can be effectively destroyed
merely by the fact that a governmental body has investigated his or her
practice.’”
Judge Alex Kozinski2
“[T]hese aggressive and ill-informed prosecutions convey a message of
intimidation to doctors and of indifference to the plight of patients in pain . . .
not even the most honest and competent doctors can practice pain medicine
with any assurance of safety for themselves or continuity of care for their
patients.”
Dr. William Hurwitz3

1. The Federal War on Pain Relief, RON PAUL’S TEXAS STRAIGHT TALK: A WEEKLY COLUMN
(Ron Paul, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 19, 2004, at www.house.gov/paul/tst/tst2004/tst041904.htm
(last visited July 23, 2008).
2. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 640 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
(quoting expert witness Alice Pasetta Mead’s report) (alterations in original).
3. Letter from Dr. William Hurwitz to Patients and Colleagues (Aug. 31, 2002) (on file
with author) (describing his reasons for closing his pain practice since his arrest and
prosecution for the prescription of opioids allegedly resulting in two patient deaths).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the course of the last decade, federal and state prosecutors have
arrested and charged several hundred physicians with criminal violations
related to their prescribing of opioid analgesics.4 In many cases, the
physicians pled guilty or were appropriately convicted. In a number of
troubling cases, however, the physicians arguably were wrongly charged.5
While some of these providers ultimately were exonerated through acquittal
or appeal, their careers, and in many cases their personal lives, were
destroyed.6 Moreover, a number of physicians have been convicted and are
serving time (or served time) in prison, but the question of their
“wrongdoing” continues to be debated.7

4. See infra text accompanying notes 20-32.
5. In some of these cases, the original charges were subsequently dropped. See, e.g.,
Doctor Ordered to Forfeit Funds, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, June 1, 2005, at L10 (noting
that murder charges were dropped in the prosecution of Dr. Jong Bek of Gary, Indiana, “when
a toxicologist determined he could not link the deaths to medications Bek prescribed”); Jim
Schultz, Testimony Starts in Fraud Case: Charges Reduced Against Doctor Accused of Trying to
Bilk Medi-Cal, REDDING REC. SEARCHLIGHT, May 13, 2004, at B1 (describing the case of Dr.
Frank Fisher of Redding, California, who was prosecuted for eight misdemeanor counts rather
than the original suspicion of murder). In some situations, the physicians were tried and
acquitted. See, e.g., Rex Bowman, No Convictions Against Physician; the Jury Acquits on
Some Charges, Can’t Reach Verdict on Others, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2003, at
B4 (describing the case of Dr. Cecil Knox, Roanoke, Virginia); Lisa Thompson, Troubles Linger
for Acquitted Doctor, ERIE TIMES-NEWS, May 30, 2006, at 1 (describing the case of Dr. Paul
Heberle, an Erie, Pennsylvania, physician who struggled with debt and cocaine addiction
despite his acquittal). In other instances, the provider was found guilty at the trial court level,
but the verdict was later overturned on appeal. See, e.g., Angie Welling, Psychiatrist Files
Lawsuit: Weitzel Sues All Involved in His Murder Trials, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake
City), Aug. 18, 2004, at B4 (Dr. Robert Weitzel of Layton, Utah, was convicted in 2000 of
“two counts of second-degree felony manslaughter and three counts of misdemeanor
negligent homicide. The verdicts were later overturned when a judge ruled prosecutors
withheld critical evidence.”).
6. See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Worried Pain Doctors Decry Prosecutions, WASH. POST,
Dec. 29, 2003, at A1 (“In recent years, . . . charges of illegally prescribing prescription
narcotics, criminal conspiracy, racketeering and even murder have been brought in dozens of
states against scores of doctors who treat chronic pain with prescription narcotics. At least two
have been imprisoned, one committed suicide, several are awaiting sentencing, many are
preparing for trial, and more have lost their licenses to practice medicine and accumulated
huge legal bills.”); Sam Stanton, Murder Case Dissolved, but So Did Doctor’s Life,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 23, 2004, at A1 (describing Dr. Frank Fisher’s case); Thompson, supra
note 5 (describing the case of Dr. Paul Heberle).
7. See, e.g., Wayne J. Guglielmo, Why Is This Indiana Doctor Sitting in Jail?, MED.
ECON., July 21, 2006, at 17 (describing the cases of brothers and co-defendants Drs. David
and Charles Chube); Tad Lonergan, A Personal Experience in the Criminal Justice System, 3
MED. SENTINEL 139, 140 (1998) (discussing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision
against the prosecutor of Dr. Tad Lonergan who was accused of lying and dishonesty in the
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The motivation for this increased attention to physician prescribing and
legal action by prosecutors appears to have roots in the war on drugs and
the recent spate of deaths related to the abuse of OxyContin, a time
released opioid analgesic approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in 1995.8 Around the same time that these drug-related deaths were
occurring, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) came under criticism
for its failure to develop measurable performance targets for its drug control
efforts and was looking for a “new front” for its battle against illegal drugs.9
As a result, in 2001, the DEA began a new anti-drug campaign targeting
the prescribing and use of OxyContin.10 The campaign raised the level of
scrutiny DEA applied to opioid analgesic use to the level applied to nonprescription street drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.11 While
employing this intense scrutiny was a response to a relatively new drug,
prosecuting physicians for prescribing narcotics has a long history in this
country and drug regulators have long attempted to balance negative effects
(toxicity, addiction, and diversion) with positive effects (therapeutic benefit
and pain relief).12
In this Article, I argue that these recent prosecutions are a result of a
significant imbalance in our drug control laws and policies. In particular, I

prosecution of the case); Frank Bass, Use of Painkillers Skyrockets, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Sept.
2, 2007, at G1 (discussing threats received by Dr. Deborah Bordeaux of “100-year sentence
if she did not help the prosecution.”); John Tierney, Editorial, Sex, Lies, and OxyContin: A
Pittsburgh Case Shows What’s Wrong with the DEA’s War Against Doctors, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Jan. 25, 2006, at B7 (stating that the testimony of one of the key witnesses in the
trial of Dr. Bernard Rottschaefer may have been perjured); see also, e.g., infra Section II
(discussing the cases of Dr. William Hurwitz and Dr. Ronald McIver); Drew Douglas, Physician
Receives Nearly 63-Year Prison Sentence for OxyContin Deaths, 11 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 461,
470 (Mar. 28, 2002) (discussing the trial of Dr. James Graves and stating that “[a]t trial, the
defense argued that many of the patients who came lied about their symptoms, usually chronic
lower back pain, in order to receive prescriptions”); Barry Meier, OxyContin Prescribers Face
Charges in Fatal Overdoses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A14 (describing the indictment of
Florida physician Denis Deonarine for felony murder in the overdose death of a patient).
8. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN ABUSE AND DIVERSION
EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 8 (2003), available at www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/
oxycontin/oxycontinGAOreport.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008).
9. Ronald T. Libby, Treating Doctors as Drug Dealers: The DEA’s War on Prescription
Painkillers, POL’Y ANALYSIS (CATO Inst., Wash., D.C.), June 16, 2005, at 1, 4, available at
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa545.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008).
10. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS AND CHEMICALS OF
CONCERN: ACTION PLAN TO PREVENT THE DIVERSION AND ABUSE OF OXYCONTIN, at
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs_concern/oxycodone/abuse_oxy.htm (last visited Aug. 9,
2008); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 8.
11. Libby, supra note 9, at 5.
12. Joseph Spillane & William B. McAllister, Keeping the Lid On: A Century of Drug
Regulation and Control, 70 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE S5, S5 (2003).
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assert that this imbalance stems from the standard in the federal Controlled
Substances Act, its state counterparts, and implementing regulations used by
prosecutors to arrest and prosecute physicians for “inappropriate”
prescribing. Under the standard, a physician is guilty of criminal conduct if
he or she prescribes without a “legitimate medical purpose” and outside
“the usual course of his professional practice.”13 Applying this standard in
these cases harms not only the physicians who are arguably wrongly
accused but also the patients of these physicians and other individuals who
suffer from chronic pain. Because many physicians fear criminal sanctions
for prescribing opioids, pain sufferers may not be able to receive adequate
pain care. The law enforcement climate surrounding prescribing opioid
analgesics appears to be causing some physicians to stop prescribing
opioids or stop treating chronic pain patients, reducing an already very
small number of physicians willing to treat these needy patients.14 As a
result, the physicians who continue to see patients with chronic pain also
make themselves an easy target for law enforcement officials.
13. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2007).
14. See Ronald T. Libby, The DEA’s “One-tenth of One Percent” Myth of Doctors Who
Are Sanctioned, Address at the CATO Institute Conference: Drug Cops and Doctors–Is the
DEA Hampering the Treatment of Chronic Pain?, at 2 (Sept. 9, 2005), available at
www.doctordeluca.com/Library/WOD/CopsDocsCato-Libby05.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008)
(estimating that the number of physicians who specialize in the treatment of chronic pain is
between 4,278 and 5,869); see also Marc Kaufman, Specialists Decry DEA Reversal on Pain
Drugs: New Rules Called a ‘Step Backward,’ WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A8
(acknowledging the strong concern among pain physicians that the DEA’s recent
pronouncements will have a chilling effect on physician prescribing, making it more difficult for
pain patients to receive adequate treatment); Tina Rosenberg, Editorial, Weighing the
Difference Between Treating Pain and Dealing Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A12
(expressing concern that the recent conviction of a physician treating chronic pain will lead to
fewer doctors who are willing to prescribe strong painkillers for their patients who suffer from
pain); Sally Satel, Doctors Behind Bars: Treating Pain Is Now Risky Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2004, at F6 (examining the law enforcement climate surrounding the prescription of pain
medications); Doug Smith, Lawmen vs. the Drug Warriors: Attorneys General Seek Change in
DEA Policy, ARK. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at 13 (quoting an advertisement by Common Sense
for Drug Policy—“a ‘drug reform’ organization”—that quotes a CATO Institute study, supra
note 9, stating the DEA’s “‘renewed war on pain doctors has frightened many physicians out
of pain management altogether, exacerbating an already serious health crisis . . . .’”); Jane
Spencer, Crackdown on Drugs Hits Chronic-Pain Patients: Amid Tighter Regulation of
Painkillers, Physicians Pull Back on Prescriptions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2004, at D1 (describing
the federal government’s increasing efforts to end prescription drug abuse and its impact on
legitimate physicians and their patients who suffer from chronic pain); Letter from Thirty State
Attorneys General to Karen Tandy, Adm’r, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin. 2 (Jan. 19, 2005),
available at www.csdp.org/naagletter.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) (asserting that a DEA
“Interim Policy Statement ‘Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain’ . . .
seems likely to have a chilling effect on physicians engaged in the legitimate practice of
medicine”).
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In Part II of this Article I describe the available data on, and selected
cases of, recent arrests and prosecutions of physicians for inappropriate
prescribing of pain medication. In Parts III and IV, I discuss the “culture
clash” and historical tension between physicians and drug enforcement
personnel, and in Part V, I describe the evolution of opioid use for chronic
pain treatment. In Parts VI and VII, I summarize the legal basis for the arrest
and prosecution of physicians in this context along with law enforcement
efforts. Finally, in parts VIII and IX, I make a series of arguments based on
legal, ethical, and policy grounds as to why the current criminal standard is
inappropriate and suggest an alternative standard that arguably more
accurately calibrates the balance between the dual goals of pain treatment
and reduction of drug diversion and abuse.
II. ARRESTS AND PROSECUTIONS OF PHYSICIANS FOR OPIOID PRESCRIBING
The exact number of physicians who have been investigated, arrested,
and/or prosecuted over the last decade for inappropriately prescribing
opioids is difficult to determine. Investigations, arrests, and charges are not
compiled in a central, publicly available database. Therefore, estimates
must be pieced together from reports, news articles, DEA statements, and
Web sites that track some of these cases. In 2001, DEA statistics indicate
that there were 3,097 diversion investigations, 861 of which were
investigations of doctors.15 In 2003, there were 736 DEA investigations and
51 arrests of physicians for diversion of controlled substances.16 Focusing
only on OxyContin, between October 1999 and March 2002, DEA
reported investigating 247 OxyContin diversion cases, which led to 328
arrests.17 And, between May 2001 and January 2004, DEA agents arrested
approximately 600 people for violation of laws related to distribution,
dispensing, or possession of OxyContin.18 Of those arrested, 60% were
professionals such as doctors and pharmacists.19 DEA also has its own Web
site that lists “investigations of physician registrants in which DEA was

15. Libby, supra note 9, at 15 (citing DEA UPDATE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AUTHORITIES, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 17-18 (Oct. 2002)).
16. The Infinite Mind: The Double Life of OxyContin (Lichtenstein Creative Media
broadcast Mar. 10, 2004), summary at www.lcmedia.com/mind313.htm (last visited July 23,
2008).
17. Controlled Substances Registration and Reregistration Application Fees, 68 Fed. Reg.
7728, 7730 (Feb. 18, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1301).
18. To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on
Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 40-41 (2004), available at www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house/pdf/108hrg/95555.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) (statement of Thomas W. Raffanello,
Special Agent in Charge, Miami Division, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration).
19. Id.
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involved that resulted in the arrest and prosecution of the registrant.”20 The
list, covering arrests from January 2003 through February 2008, includes
117 physicians, at least 47 of whom were arrested for prescribing pain
medication outside the scope of professional practice or without a legitimate
medical purpose.21 This figure is based solely on selected federal arrests
announced by the DEA. Therefore, it underestimates the total of such law
enforcement actions, which also include arrests by state law enforcement
personnel.
An effort to compile a list of arrests and prosecutions of physicians for
illegal distribution of opioids from newspaper accounts and Web sites
between 1998 and 2005 yielded 205 cases.22 Charges in the cases ranged
from rape23 to murder,24 felony murder,25 manslaughter,26 drug trafficking,27

20. Office of Diversion Control, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Cases Against Doctors:
Criminal Cases, at www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/crim_admin_actions/crim_actions.htm (last
visited Aug. 9, 2008).
21. Id. Of the 47 physicians, 32 pled guilty, 13 were convicted by a jury, 2 are awaiting
trial, and one has a pending adjudication. Id.
22. See David Brushwood, Criminal Prosecutions of Physicians for Offenses Related to the
Prescribing of Scheduled Opioid Analgesics 1998-2003 (on file with the author) (listing
criminal prosecutions of sixty-eight physicians in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia). Other similar lists are
available. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc., Pain Management - Physician
Prosecutions and Board Actions, at www.aapsonline.org/painman/pm-ppba.htm (last visited
Aug. 9, 2008) (lists physicians arrested for illegal prescribing of opioids); Our Chronic Pain
Mission, Pain Politics, at www.cpmission.com/politics/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (listing
physicians prosecuted by the DEA); Pain Relief Network, Information and Research: Clinical
Litigation, at www.painreliefnetwork.org/clinical-litigation/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (listing
information about the cases of eight physicians).
23. See, e.g., Duane Bourne, Charges Against Doctor Dismissed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 31, 2003, at 1 (stating that prosecutors dropped charges against Dr. A. Hussam
Armashi, a Florida doctor accused of raping a patient to whom he had prescribed high-dose
pain medications).
24. See, e.g., Todd Dvorak, Court Upholds Ex-Doctor’s Homicide Conviction, SOUTH
BEND TRIB., July 27, 2000, at D1 (discussing South Bend, Indiana, doctor Ernest Stiller’s
conviction for killing a woman who died from the combined effects of three drugs, two of
which were prescribed and one of which was “a painkiller”); Becky Purser, Perry Doctor Turns
Self In, MACON TELEGRAPH, July 27, 2004, at A1 (describing Dr. Spurgeon Green, Perry,
Georgia, indicted for the murder of six patients due to overdose from prescribed drugs); Scott
Sandlin, Prescribing Doctor Gets Probation, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 23, 2004, at A1
(discussing the probation order of Dr. Jesse Benjamin Henry, Jr., Albuquerque, New Mexico,
who was accused, along with his wife of murdering seven patients for whom methadone and
other opioid analgesics were prescribed); Ralph Vartabedian, Jury Finds Doctor Not Guilty:
The Operator of a Shasta County Clinic Was Accused of Improperly Prescribing Painkillers and
of Medi-Cal Fraud in a Long-Running Case, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at B6 (discussing the
not guilty verdict of Dr. Frank Fisher, Redding, California, accused of prescribing high doses
of opioids to patients who died).
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illegal drug distribution,28 illegal delivery of a controlled substance,29 and
unlawful prescribing.30 In February 2002, Dr. James Graves became the
first physician to be criminally convicted of OxyContin related deaths.31 He
was sentenced to 62.9 years in prison.32
While many of these arrests and prosecutions were appropriate, a
number were not. The following represent some of the most troubling

25. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 7 (describing the indictment of Florida physician Denis
Deonarine, for felony murder in the overdose death of a patient); Sharlonda L. Waterhouse,
Gary Doctor Held on Murder, Charges of Dealing Drugs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 24, 2002, at
16 (describing the case of Dr. Jong H. Bek, who was charged with felony murder based on
prescriptions he gave to “two men [who] were killed by a cocktail of legal and illegal drugs,
some of which were obtained through Bek”).
26. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 7 (describing the case of Dr. James Graves, of Pace,
Florida, who was accused of causing the overdose deaths of four patients for whom he had
prescribed OxyContin and other drugs); John Pacenti & Antigone Barton, Psychiatrist Gets
Year for Patient’s Pill Death, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 1C (describing the case of Dr.
George Kubski, a West Palm Beach, Florida physician who prescribed 20,000 pills in the
three months prior to a patient’s death and was sentenced to jail for “manslaughter by
culpable negligence”); Sarah Prohaska, Doctor Convicted of 1 Death, Trafficking: Acquitted in
Gardens Man’s Death, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 7, 2006, at 1A (describing the case of Dr.
Asuncion Luyao, a Port St. Lucie, Florida physician, who had six patients die from alleged
OxyContin overdoses).
27. See, e.g., Alex Kuczynski, Is It Botox, or Is It Bogus?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, § 9, at
1 (describing the case of Dr. Bach McComb, of Sarasota, Florida, who was accused of
trafficking addictive pain medications such as oxycodone); Sandlin, supra note 24 (describing
the case of Dr. Jesse Benjamin Henry, Jr.); Jay Ditzer, Drug-Abusing Doctors, WHAS11 NEWS
(Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 23, 2004, at www.whas11.com/topstories/stories/WHAS11_TOP_Drug
Doctors.81a2e2a0.html (last visited July 23, 2008) (stating that Dr. Brent Ryabik, a psychiatrist
from Kentucky, was “accused of trafficking prescription drugs”).
28. See, e.g., Anne T. Denogean, Doctor Faces 108 Charges: Jeri B. Hassman Allegedly
Overprescribed Pain Medication and Is Accused of Health-Care Fraud, TUCSON CITIZEN, Apr.
1, 2003, at 1D (describing charges against a Tucson, Arizona physician, including over 100
counts of prescribing morphine, methadone, Vicodin, and OxyContin “without a legitimate
medical reason”); see also News Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Va., July 26,
2001, at www.oig.dol.gov/public/media/vmody.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (announcing
a 140-count indictment against Oakwood, Virginia doctor Kailas Modi and her husband Dr.
Vinod Modi, including “63 counts of unlawfully dispensing prescription drugs”).
29. See, e.g., Kelly Wolfe, Patients Stand by Their Beset Physician, PALM BEACH POST, Nov.
10, 2003, at 1A (discussing the arrest of Dr. Darshan Shah, a Vero Beach, Florida doctor who
allegedly pre-signed blank prescriptions for a nurse practitioner who was doing the actual
prescribing of “powerful painkillers”).
30. See, e.g., Korie Wilkins, Two Doctors Accused of Issuing Fake Prescriptions, DAILY
OAKLAND PRESS, Apr. 19, 2005, at A1(explaining the case of Dr. Subadra Deandra and Dr.
Dewundara Dayananda, of Waterford Township, Michigan, who allegedly sold prescriptions
for painkillers for $100).
31. Douglas, supra note 7, at 469.
32. Id.
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arrests and prosecutions of physicians related to their prescribing of opioids
and demonstrate the difficulty of applying the prevailing criminal law
standard set forth in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to these kinds of
cases. While they are only a fraction of the cases brought against
physicians, they illustrate several themes of the larger body of arrests and
prosecutions. For example, in many of the cases, (1) the physicians treated
a large number of chronic pain patients and prescribed large volumes of
opioids; (2) there was no evidence that the physicians benefited financially
from their prescribing (other than for the office visit); (3) experts disputed the
“reasonableness” of the physician’s prescribing practices; and (4) the
physician’s patients often included drug addicts who lied to the physician to
obtain their drugs.
A.

Dr. Frank Fisher

Dr. Frank Fisher operated a clinic near Redding, California, from 1995
until February 1999, when he was arrested for prescribing large dosages of
opioids that allegedly were related to several deaths.33 At the time of his
arrest, his practice consisted of about 3,000 patients.34 Fisher graduated
from Harvard Medical School and practiced general medicine for over
twenty years, primarily in underserved communities, including healthcare
facilities on Native American reservations.35 He opened the clinic near
Redding “to serve the general practice and urgent care needs of the
MediCal population of Shasta County[,]” California.36 Approximately 5%–
10% of his patients suffered from severe, chronic intractable pain and he
prescribed opioids for many of them.37
On February 18, 1999, over twenty armed law enforcement agents
stormed into Fisher’s clinic and arrested him.38 The California Attorney
General charged Dr. Fisher with prescribing excessive amounts of controlled
substances and three counts of first degree murder stemming from those
prescriptions.39 Later, two additional murder charges were added.40

33. Stanton, supra note 6; Pain Doctor and Pharmacist Arrested for Mass Murder, at
What Was Dr. Fisher’s Clinic Doing? (undated, un-paginated pamphlet from Dr. Fisher’s
clinic, on file with author) [hereinafter Fisher Fact Sheet].
34. Stanton, supra note 6.
35. Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at Who is Dr. Fisher?.
36. Id. at What Was Dr. Fisher’s Clinic Doing?.
37. Stanton, supra note 6.
38. David B. Brushwood, Commentary, Professional Casualties in America’s War on
Drugs, 60 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 2004, 2004 (2003); Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note
33, at What Was the Arrest Like?.
39. Lynda Gledhill & Suzanne Espinosa Solis, Doctor, 2 Pharmacists Held in Shasta Drug
Sting: Investigators Link Ring to 3 Fatal Overdoses, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 1999, at A1 (noting
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Because Fisher could not make his $15 million bail, he spent five months in
jail during his preliminary hearing.41 At the close of the hearing, in July
1999, the judge dismissed two of the murder charges and reduced the three
remaining murder charges to involuntary manslaughter.42 Apparently, the
evidence showing the deaths with which Fisher was charged resulted from
his patients taking the medications that he prescribed was inadequate.43
For example, one of the patients for whom he prescribed opioids died as a
passenger in an automobile accident.44 Another death occurred when a
non-patient stole and overdosed on medications that Fisher had prescribed
to a patient.45 While Dr. Fisher was in jail, a patient, with a documented
history of pain and need for opioids, became despondent because she was
unable to obtain her pain medications and died.46 Fisher was “released on
[his] own recognizance, subject to the condition that [he] not practice
medicine . . . until the matter was resolved.”47
The prosecution’s case against Fisher was largely based on the volume
of opioids he prescribed—Fisher was the largest prescriber of OxyContin in
the state.48 Yet, an expert witness for the prosecution testified that the opioid
dosages that Dr. Fisher prescribed were not unreasonable and that he, the
expert, frequently prescribed higher dosages for his patients.49 In his
defense, Fisher asserted that he adhered to accepted standards of care and
practices for treatment of pain patients including:
• [r]igorous pre-treatment screening to exclude potential abusers of pain
medications. . . . ;

the twenty-seven count indictment against Fisher on murder and fraud charges); see also
Brushwood, supra note 38 (discussing the charges in the Fisher case).
40. Brushwood, supra note 38; Carl T. Hall, Jury Acquits Doctor in Pain-Control Test
Case, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 2004, at A1.
41. Brushwood, supra note 38, at 2004-05; Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at What
Was the Arrest Like?.
42. Gary Delsohn, Doctor’s Murder Charges Dropped: Shasta Judge Substitutes
Involuntary Manslaughter Counts, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 16, 1999, at A1. (“The involuntary
manslaughter charges were allowed to stand . . . because Fisher . . . should have understood
the risk involved in prescribing . . . high amounts of addictive painkillers.”).
43. See id.
44. Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at Were Murder Charges Appropriate?.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Brushwood, supra note 38, at 2005.
48. See Stanton, supra note 6 (“The huge amount of painkilling medicine Fisher was
prescribing is what led to the case in the first place. Medi-Cal officials noted there had been
an enormous jump in such prescriptions in 1998, with Fisher dispensing more of the medicine
than any of the other 50,000 OxyContin prescribers in the state.”).
49. Brushwood, supra note 38, at 2005.
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• [m]andatory mental health evaluations of all [c]hronic [p]ain patients by
a licensed professional;
• [e]jection of patients caught lying, diverting medications or ingesting
non-therapeutic doses. . . . ;
• [r]egular and frequent blood and urine testing for medication serum
levels, as well as for illegal substances;
• [m]andatory signature of a Controlled Substances Agreement by each
[c]hronic [p]ain patient containing: 1) an informed consent, 2) an
agreement not to divert medications, and 3) an agreement to report any
misuse or diversion of medications.50

Following these practices, Fisher terminated more than 400 patients from
his clinic.51
Three years after his arrest, the manslaughter and drug diversion
charges against Fisher were dropped, and, approximately one and a half
years later, Fisher was acquitted of further charges of defrauding the MediCal system.52 Fisher claims the alleged fraud amounted to approximately
$150 in overbilling.53 Although Fisher was exonerated of all criminal
charges, he faced potential disciplinary action by the state medical board
and civil suits brought by the relatives of patients of his who died allegedly
as a result of his negligent prescribing of opioids.54 In February 2005, the
last of four wrongful death suits against him was dismissed.55 The court
ordered two of the four plaintiffs to pay Fisher damages.56
Although the judge presiding over the criminal case had forbidden
Fisher to practice medicine while he was out on bail, the state never
suspended his license.57 However, on August 10, 2005, the Board
50. Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at Did Dr. Fisher Practice Good Medicine?.
51. Radley Balko, Another Victim of the Drug War, FREEMAN, Apr. 2005, at 12, 13,
available at www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/issue.asp?fid=276 (last visited July 23,
2008); see also Stanton, supra note 6 (“Fisher estimate[d] that state undercover agents visited
him at least seven times trying to obtain prescriptions using bogus ailments, and that he
refused to provide them with medicine.”).
52. Maline Hazle, Fisher’s Ordeal Finally Is Over: Last of Four Death Suits Dismissed,
REDDING REC. SEARCHLIGHT, Feb. 2, 2005, at A1; Not With a Bang but a Whimper: California
Pain Doctor Frank Fisher Exonerated in Last Criminal Case, DRUG WAR CHRON. (Drug Reform
Coordination Network, Wash., D.C.), May 21, 2004, at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicleold/338/frank.shtml (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) [hereinafter DRUG WAR CHRON.].
53. Hall, supra note 40.
54. Id.; see also DRUG WAR CHRON., supra note 52 (“[T]he attorney general is now going
to prosecute me yet again on the same charges, this time before the state medical board.
They will try to go after my license in an administrative venue . . . .” (quoting Dr. Fisher)).
55. See Hazle, supra note 52.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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sentenced him to three years of probation under the condition that he would
take a refresher course in general medicine, keep a list of any controlled
substances that he prescribes, and have his cases monitored.58
B.

Dr. Cecil Knox

In 1992, after serving as medical director of the rehabilitation unit at
Lewis Gale Hospital in Roanoke, Virginia, Dr. Cecil Knox opened his own
outpatient clinic, Southwest Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation.59 His
practice focused on pain management and physical rehabilitation.60
On February 1, 2002, more than a dozen federal agents burst into
Knox’s office with guns drawn while he was seeing patients and arrested
him.61 He was taken away in handcuffs and leg irons and was indicted on
numerous charges that he allegedly prescribed narcotics outside the scope
of legitimate medical practice, which led to several overdose deaths.62 His
office manager was indicted on the same charges.63 In October 2002, a
federal grand jury indicted Knox on fifty drug-related charges and nineteen
fraud, racketeering, and conspiracy charges related to his billing practices.64
According to news accounts of the trial, prosecutors alleged that Knox ran a
“pill mill” from his office where he handed out “prescriptions for powerful
drugs like OxyContin and methadone to known addicts and others who
came to see him with stories of severe pain.”65 They alleged that his
“eagerness to prescribe potent drugs contributed to the deaths of seven
patients”66 and that he was the nineteenth leading prescriber of OxyContin

58. In re Fisher, No. 02-1999-95522, at 3-8 (Div. of Med. Quality, Med. Board of Ca.
July 11, 2005) (Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order), available at
http://publicdocs.medbd.ca.gov/pdl/mbc.aspx (enter Frank Fisher’s name in search boxes);
see also Hazle, supra note 52.
59. Jen McCaffery, Knox Takes Stand and Testifies in His Own Defense: Oxycontin ‘Was a
Real Godsend for Chronic Pain Management,’ Doctor Says, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003,
at A1 [hereinafter McCaffery, Knox Takes Stand and Testifies in His Own Defense].
60. Id.
61. Maia Szalavitz, Dr. Feelscared: Drug Warriors Put the Fear of Prosecution in Physicians
Who Dare to Treat Pain, REASON, Aug. 2004, at 32.
62. Id.
63. Jen McCaffery, Drug Users’ Injuries Could Lengthen Sentences: 2 Heroin Conspiracy
Cases Involve 2 Deaths and 6 Other Overdoses, Prosecutor Says, ROANOKE TIMES, July 28,
2002, at B1 [hereinafter McCaffery, Drug Users’ Injuries Could Lengthen Sentences]. Two of
Knox’s employees were charged initially, but only his office manager was indicted. Id.
64. Bowman, supra note 5.
65. Id.
66. Id. Other news accounts report as many as ten deaths. See, e.g., McCaffery, Drug
Users’ Injuries Could Lengthen Sentences, supra note 63 (describing charges that Knox
“overprescribed drugs that either killed or seriously injured 10 of his patients. Federal
prosecutors will not confirm how many deaths versus serious injuries, they argue, have
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in the country.67 They also brought forth witnesses who illustrated the risks
of treating patients with chronic pain. Several former patients testified that
they lied to Dr. Knox about their pain in order to obtain a prescription for a
narcotic.68 One patient told Knox “he was in pain and always seemed to
run out of his OxyContin weeks early.”69 Another patient “injected
OxyContin in the sole of his foot so no track marks would be visible in a
typical medical exam.”70
Knox argued that several of the overdose deaths occurred over a year
and a half after he had stopped prescribing medications for these patients.71
To the extent he prescribed for individuals with a drug addiction, he said
that he did so to treat their pain.72 For example, Knox treated Edgar
O’Brien, a recovering heroin addict, for knee and back pain.73 O’Brien,
like many others whom Knox treated, “presented him with difficult
choices.”74 During Knox’s testimony, he stated that “he regularly had to
make decisions about the consequences of treating people [with histories of
psychiatric problems or substance abuse] instead of turning them away.”75
He was concerned that if he did not treat O’Brien, he would obtain his
drugs illegally on the street.76 However, after Knox discovered that O’Brien
was abusing the painkillers he had prescribed, he stopped prescribing
medication for O’Brien and never saw him again.77 O’Brien died from an

resulted”); Jen McCaffery, Knox Defends Care of Patients: Cross-Examination Expected Today,
ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at B1 (describing Knox’s testimony defending himself and
listing “eight patients who fatally overdosed”) [hereinafter McCaffery, Knox Defends Care of
Patients].
67. Bowman, supra note 5 (stating that “in one year alone, Knox wrote prescriptions for
$1.6 million worth of OxyContin”); see also McCaffery, Knox Takes Stand and Testifies in His
Own Defense, supra note 59 (describing how prosecutors made unrelated allegations to paint
an unflattering picture of Knox, including witness testimony that Knox smoked marijuana with
patients and an employee on more than one occasion).
68. See, e.g., Jen McCaffery, Ex-Patients of Dr. Knox Testify They Lied to Him: All 3 Have
Been Convicted of Crimes that Stem from Abuse of Prescription Drugs, ROANOKE TIMES, Sept.
25, 2003, at B1 (describing several of Dr. Knox’s patients who did not become patients
through traditional referrals and lied about their backgrounds in order “to get in good with
him”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Jen McCaffery, Woman in Knox Trial Cleared of All Charges: Judge Clears
Kathleen O’Gee, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003, at A1.
72. See McCaffery, Knox Defends Care of Patients, supra note 66.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. McCaffery, Knox Defends Care of Patients, supra note 66.
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overdose approximately nineteen months after Knox last prescribed any
medication for him.78
After eight weeks of testimony, one of the longest trials in recent history
in western Virginia,79 a U.S. District Court jury found Knox not guilty of thirty
of the sixty-nine charges against him.80 The jurors were unable to reach a
verdict on the remaining counts and the presiding judge declared a
mistrial.81 One juror commented that the decision not to convict was based
on the prosecution’s failure to show that Knox had the knowledge or intent
to commit the crimes of which he was accused.82 According to the juror, the
evidence indicated that Knox had made some mistakes and may have been
careless but was not sufficient to show that Knox’s prescribing constituted
criminal behavior.83
Despite the jury’s decision, federal prosecutors continued to pursue Knox
aggressively and three months after his first trial ended, Knox was indicted
again, facing ninety-five charges, “including racketeering, conspiracy to
commit racketeering, criminal conspiracy, mail fraud and perjury.”84 These
new allegations included fourteen charges that Knox’s opioid prescriptions
were outside the scope of legitimate medical practice and led to death or
serious bodily injury.85 Shortly before the second trial, Knox entered into a
plea bargain with federal prosecutors.86 According to an op-ed piece
written by his wife, he agreed to the plea bargain for a number of reasons.87
In addition to having borrowed over $1 million and needing another halfmillion to continue defending himself, Knox was diagnosed with non-

78. Id.
79. Jen McCaffery, Jury Finds Pain Specialist Not Guilty on Many Charges, ROANOKE
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter McCaffery, Jury Finds Pain Specialist Not Guilty on
Many Charges].
80. Bowman, supra note 5; see also McCaffery, Jury Finds Pain Specialist Not Guilty on
Many Charges, supra note 79 (listing the Knox verdicts).
81. Bowman, supra note 5.
82. McCaffery, Jury Finds Pain Specialist Not Guilty on Many Charges, supra note 79.
83. Id.
84. Lindsey Nair, Dr. Knox Pleads Guilty, Surrenders License, ROANOKE TIMES, Sept. 3,
2005, at A1 (“The racketeering charge relate[d] to two incidents . . . when Knox distributed
the controlled substance Fastin [a diet pill] to a patient with the understanding that she would
share the drug with him. Those acts constitute racketeering because they represent a pattern
of illegal activity committed within the operation of an enterprise, the medical practice.”)
[hereinafter Nair, Dr. Knox Pleads Guilty, Surrenders License].
85. Jen McCaffery, Grand Jury Hands Down Charges Against Dr. Knox, ROANOKE TIMES,
June 18, 2004, at B8.
86. Donna Knox, Editorial, Self-Absorbed Prosecutor Goes Too Far, ROANOKE TIMES, Jan.
26, 2006, at B9.
87. Id. Donna Knox is a former journalist, an advocate for missing American servicemen,
and a family law practitioner in Roanoke, Virginia. See id.
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Hodgkin’s lymphoma during the criminal proceedings.88 Although his
cancer was in remission, Knox was concerned that the stress of another trial
might provoke a relapse.89 Finally, he wanted the ordeal to end for his
office manager, whom the federal prosecutor “had tormented for refusing to
capitulate.”90
Knox reluctantly entered into a plea agreement but admitted to only
minor misconduct unrelated to treating pain patients.91 He was sentenced
to five years of probation and voluntarily surrendered his state medical
license and his DEA registration number.92 After the plea bargain, Knox
worked as a cobbler in a shoe store in Roanoke, Virginia.93
C. Dr. William Hurwitz
In September 2003, Dr. William Hurwitz was arrested on a forty-nine
count federal indictment charging him with “drug trafficking resulting in
death and serious injury, engaging in a criminal enterprise, conspiracy and
health care fraud.”94 He was visiting his children on the eve of Rosh
Hashanah when federal agents took him away in handcuffs.95 The
indictment was a result of a “wide-ranging federal investigation into doctors,
pharmacists and patients suspected of selling potent and addictive
painkillers on a lucrative black market.”96 More than forty people were
convicted in the comprehensive probe.97 According to a news account of
the arrest, “[t]he indictment signal[ed] an aggressive push by federal
prosecutors to hold doctors accountable for what happens to the drugs they
prescribe” and “highlight[ed] the complexities of proving criminal culpability
in cases of licensed and reputable physicians prescribing a legal
painkiller.”98 Hurwitz, like Knox, was one of the first physicians to be
charged with conspiracy related to his prescribing of opioids.99 According
to the grand jury, “Hurwitz prescribed ‘countless prescriptions for excessive
doses’ of controlled drugs with the goal of hooking his patients, getting

88. Id.; Nair, Dr. Knox Pleads Guilty, Surrenders License, supra note 84.
89. Knox, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Lindsey Nair, Pain Doctor Loses License, but Gets No Jail Time, ROANOKE TIMES, Jan.
21, 2006, at A1.
93. Id.
94. Josh White, N.Va. Doctor Indicted in OxyContin Scheme, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
2003, at B6.
95. Szalavitz, supra note 61.
96. White, supra note 94.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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them to pay him a monthly fee and encouraging illegal sales.”100 Of the
forty-nine charges, the most serious were that in two cases the conspiracy
caused fatal overdoses.101 Furthermore, “[t]he indictment allege[d] that
Hurwitz prescribed medications in as many as [thirty-nine] states, issuing the
prescriptions with little or no physical examination and sometimes over the
phone, fax, or the Internet.”102
Hurwitz received his medical degree from Stanford University in 1971
and law degree from George Mason University School of Law in 1996.103
Prior to his criminal arrest, Hurwitz was prosecuted by the Virginia Board of
Medicine and, in August 1996, had his license to practice in Virginia
revoked based on excessive prescribing and inadequate supervision of his
patients.104 The Board initiated its action after two of his patients died in
January 1996.105 Hurwitz argued that one of the patients committed suicide
by taking multiple times the recommended dose of a drug that he prescribed
and that the other died as a result of gastric bleeding, not an overdose.106
The Board took action despite the fact that “expert testimony had essentially
disproven the state’s allegation that Hurwitz was at fault.”107 Based on the
evidence, the Board dropped its initial allegations against Hurwitz,
recognizing that individuals with chronic pain often require high dosages of
narcotics, but pursued action against him based on “prescribing without
adequate medical records.”108 The Board argued that Hurwitz prescribed
hundreds and thousands of doses to patients without appropriately
monitoring their progress or status.109 Hurwitz stated that “most of his pain
patients came to him with well-established problems” and that his main
purpose in doing a physical exam was to ensure that the patient’s complaint

100. Id.
101. White, supra note 94.
102. Id.
103. Common Sense for Drug Policy/Partnership for Responsible Drug Information,
CSDP/PRDI Experts Directory: William E. Hurwitz, at www.csdp.org/csdpcgi/experts.pl?i=84
(last visited Aug. 9, 2008).
104. Jacob Sullum, No Relief in Sight, REASON, Jan. 1997, at 22, 23, 27 (“[T]he Virginia
Board of Medicine had suspended Hurwitz’s license, charging him with excessive prescribing
and inadequate supervision of his patients.”).
105. Id. at 27.
106. Id. at 28.
107. War on Pain Control: State and DEA Tell Pain Patients to “Drop Dead,” ACTIVIST
GUIDE (Drug Reform Coordination Network, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 20, 1996, at
www.drcnet.org/guide10-96/pain.html (last visited July 23, 2008)[hereinafter Drug Reform
Coordination Network].
108. Wayne J. Guglielmo, Treating Pain: Can Doctors Put Their Fears to Rest?, MED.
ECON., Feb. 21, 2000, at 46, 54.
109. See Sullum, supra note 104, at 28.
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was well founded.110 He saw patients who lived in the area once a month
but saw those who lived out of state only once or twice a year.111 He
supplemented out-of-state patients’ visits with “a monthly written report and
telephone calls.”112
Hurwitz’s license was suspended for three months and then restored on
a probationary basis.113 He also lost his DEA privileges to prescribe
narcotics for a year.114 Dr. Hurwitz appealed the Virginia Board’s decision,
arguing, in part, that the safe harbor provisions of the state’s Intractable
Pain Act limit the Board’s authority to take action against a medical doctor
based on the dosages of pain medicine prescribed.115 The Virginia Circuit
Court, however, affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that it acted in
accordance with the law, did not make a procedural error resulting in harm,
and had sufficient evidentiary support for its findings of facts.116
During the disciplinary proceedings, a number of pain experts supported
Hurwitz’s practices. Dr. James Campbell, professor of neurosurgery and
director of the Blaustein Pain Treatment Center at Johns Hopkins University
in Baltimore, stated that at Hopkins, they have a national practice:
We have great difficulty finding physicians . . . that will take over
medications that work in these patients and take over their programs.
I think (Dr. Hurwitz) is doing heroic things for his patients. I think what he is
doing involves an enormous sacrifice. There are a lot of bad doctors but he
is not one of them.
If we suspend the license of all doctors . . . because one patient committed
suicide, the pain field would be out of business.117

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Arthur Allen, First Do No Harm, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997 (Magazine), at W11,
W12.
114. Id. Approximately forty-eight of Hurwitz’s patients testified at the hearing on
revocation of his Virginia license, including some from other parts of the country. Two
hundred twenty of his patients filed a class action suit against the Board seeking the return of
Hurwitz’s privileges, “arguing that his inability to prescribe . . . limited their access to drugs
they need to live and violated their rights under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act.” Id.
The suit was dismissed in an unpublished decision in 1996. See Cooper v. Hasty, No. 971002, 1997 WL 472160, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 1997).
115. See Hurwitz v. Bd. of Med., 46 Va. Cir. 119 (1998).
116. Id. Based on the Virginia proceedings, the District of Columbia medical board
subsequently suspended Hurwitz’s D.C. license by reciprocal action but later reinstated it. See
Allen, supra note 113, at W29.
117. Deborah Kelly, Ethics Questions Surround Doctor’s Case: Opinions Clash About
Hurwitz’s Narcotic Treatments, Role in Deaths, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 1996, at
E1 (alterations in original).
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Dr. Mitchell Max, director of the Pain Research Clinic at the National
Institutes of Health, also defended Hurwitz, stating:
I see nothing wrong with the doses, the amount, the number of pills, per
se. . . . He is just taking regimens that work in cancer patients that everyone
agrees on, and using them in people who had life-impairing, or even lifethreatening, levels of pain. . . . We routinely give doses up to 10 times that
size in patients with cancer.118

In the summer of 1998, after his license was reinstated and before his
arrest, Hurwitz was able to prescribe controlled substances and began to
treat pain again.119 The Web site describing his practice stated:
The practice concentrates on the evaluation and management of patients
with intractable pain who require opioid medications. This treatment
remains controversial and is subject to close scrutiny by state and federal
regulatory authorities.
....
The practice offers Therapeutic Trials of Opioid Medication and Opioid
Maintenance Therapy. Opioid therapy is complicated. These medications
are potentially dangerous. They may cause a variety of acute and chronic
side effects. Both the administration and the discontinuation of these
medications require an informed and responsible patient and careful
medical management.120

Dr. Hurwitz’s criminal trial began in November 2004.121 During the sixweek trial, the prosecution called more than sixty witnesses and played tapes
of Hurwitz talking to patients who he did not realize were government
informants.122 Also during the trial, several past presidents of the American
Pain Society sent a letter to Hurwitz’s lawyer expressing their dismay at how
the case was being handled.123 In particular, they cited “misrepresentations”

118. Id. (alterations in original).
119. See Dr. William Hurwitz, at www.drhurwitz.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (former
Web site, printout on file with author).
120. Id.
121. See Jerry Markon, Pain Doctor Convicted of Drug Charges; Va. Man Faces Possible
Life Term on Trafficking Counts, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at A1.
122. Id.
123. See Letter from six past presidents of the American Pain Society to Marvin D. Miller,
attorney for Dr. William Hurwitz (Dec. 10, 2004), at www.aapsonline.org/painman/
hurwitzletter.htm (last visited July 23, 2008) (The letter was written by six pain treatment
experts, including physicians from Johns Hopkins University Medical Center, Albert Einstein
College of Medicine, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, and Beth Israel Medical
Center, among others.).
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by one of the Justice Department’s expert witnesses.124 A similar letter was
subsequently presented to the presiding judge.125
On December 15, 2004, a federal jury convicted Hurwitz on fifty
counts, including drug trafficking, which led to the death of one patient and
seriously injured two other patients.126 The jury acquitted him of nine other
counts and deadlocked on three counts.127 The prosecution sought a life
sentence without parole,128 but the district court sentenced Hurwitz to twentyfive years in prison.129
The outcome sent chills through the pain treatment community and was
criticized by a number of prominent journalists.130 Hurwitz appealed the
convictions on three grounds, one of which was that the court instructed the
jury that it could not consider Hurwitz’s “good faith” in his prescribing.131
Hurwitz argued that “his good faith in issuing the challenged prescriptions
was relevant to his intent when treating his patients and thus relevant to the
jury’s determination of whether he acted outside the bounds of accepted
medical practice or without a legitimate medical purpose.”132

124. Id.
125. Letter from Jane M. Orient, Executive Dir., Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc.,
to Leonard D. Wexler, Judge, United States Dist. Ct., E. Dist. of Va. (Feb. 5, 2004), at
www.aapsonline.org/painman/hurwitzletter2.htm (last visited July 23, 2008). The letter to the
judge, sent after conviction and before sentencing, describes the expert medical testimony for
the prosecution as “false” and “egregious” and the errors of the government’s expert witness
as “shocking, highly material, and profoundly unjust.” Id.
126. Markon, supra note 121.
127. Id.
128. Rosenberg, supra note 14.
129. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 469 (4th Cir. 2006).
130. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 14 (describing Hurwitz as “a prominent doctor
committed to aggressive treatment of pain” and arguing that, while “[h]is behavior in some
cases was inexcusable” and he should have supervised patients on large dosages of opioids
more closely, such malpractice should have been cause for the loss of his medical license
rather than criminal charges). To many it appears that he was prosecuted and convicted
because he prescribed opioids to patients who were drug addicts or subsequently sold their
pills. While Hurwitz did terminate patients whom he believed to be abusing their prescriptions,
he slowly reduced the dosage for most of them because he felt that “cutting off patients was
tantamount to torture, and he did not do so without strong evidence of bad behavior.” Id.; see
also Jacob Sullum, The Doctor Is Not a Criminal: A Painful Drug-War Case in Virginia, NAT’L
REV., May 23, 2005, at 1, 28 (stating that the jurors “confused their role . . . in a criminal
case with the roles of the state medical board that regulates doctors and the civil courts that
hear malpractice lawsuits” and that the conviction “is bound to have a chilling effect on pain
treatment, which is already scandalously inadequate because of the fear instilled by the war
on drugs”).
131. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 475-76.
132. Id. at 476.
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The court of appeals “agree[d] with Hurwitz that a doctor’s good faith
generally is relevant to a jury’s determination of whether the doctor acted
outside the bounds of medical practice or with a legitimate medical purpose
when prescribing narcotics.”133 The case was retried at the district court
level with the appropriate instruction in April 2007.134 After deliberating for
seven days, on April 27th, a jury found Hurwitz guilty on 16 counts of drug
trafficking, acquitted him on 17 counts, and was unable to reach a verdict
on the remaining 12 counts.135 On July 13, 2007, the district court judge
sentenced Hurwitz to fifty-seven months in prison.136 The two and a half
years he had already served would count toward this term and he would be
given time off for good behavior.137 While the judge had some sympathy
for Hurwitz, she felt that the sentence was warranted because Hurwitz was
“willfully blind” to the actions of his patients who were diverting their
drugs.138
D. Dr. Jeri Hassman
In March 2003, federal officials marched into Dr. Jeri Hassman’s office
while she was treating a patient, “took off her jewelry, put her in handcuffs
and led her to jail.”139 Hassman was a specialist in rehabilitation medicine
and pain management in Tucson, Arizona.140 Before the arrest, the DEA
placed Hassman and some of her patients under surveillance and sent
undercover patients to her office to complain about pain.141 She was also

133. Id.
134. Jerry Markon, Va. Pain Doctor’s Prison Term Is Cut to 57 Months: Originally
Sentenced to 25 Years, Specialist Did More Good Than Harm, Judge Says, WASH. POST, July
14, 2007, at B1.
135. Id.; Tierney Lab: Putting Ideas in Science to the Test, http://tierneylab.blogs.
nytimes.com/2007/04/27/dr-hurwitz-convicted-of-16-drug-trafficking-charges/ (Apr. 27,
2007, 21:00 EST).
136. Transcript of Sentencing at 44-45, United States v. William Eliot Hurwitz, No.
1:03cr467 (E.D. Va. July 13, 2007).
137. Id. at 45, 47.
138. See id. at 44 (“[T]here does need to be a reasonable message sent to the people in
the medical profession that if they practice appropriately and by the right rules . . . they should
fear nothing, but if they absolutely blind themselves to what are clearly rational, clear signals
of illegal conduct, then those doctors working with these types of potent medications simply
have to put the brakes on.”).
139. Kaufman, supra note 6.
140. See id.
141. Id. One informant had been seeking treatment from Dr. Hassman over a four-year
period and had only received physical therapy for back pain. A. Bates Butler III, Attorney for
Dr. Jeri Hassman, Pitfalls of Chronic Pain Management, Presentation to the Arizona Society for
Healthcare Risk Management 7 (Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with author). When he complained
of increased pain and “told her a friend had given him Oxycodone that had helped alleviate
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under investigation by the Arizona Medical Board, and the Board had
worked with her by arranging for a mentor, an expert in pain management
and addiction, to improve her documentation and increase her use of urine
drug screens.142 This mentoring occurred in September and October 2002,
but subsequently, without contacting the Arizona Medical Board, the DEA
suspended Dr. Hassman’s DEA registration (without which she could not
prescribe controlled substances).143 According to her attorney, “[t]he
suspension occurred before Dr. Hassman’s records were reviewed by any
physician.”144 Just two weeks before a hearing on the suspension was
scheduled, Hassman was indicted145 and “charged with 362 counts of
prescribing controlled drugs outside the normal practice of medicine.”146
Based on a news account of her arrest, “[i]n the federal criminal
complaint against her, the sole allegation [was] that she prescribed
controlled substances ‘not being in the usual course of professional practice
and not for any legitimate medical purpose.’”147 The news account further
reported that the action was taken against Hassman after the DEA taperecorded a conversation between her and the state Board.148
After her arrest, Hassman issued a press statement in which she
admitted that there is a problem of drug abusers illegally distributing
prescription drugs but that, at the same time, there are millions of people
suffering with severe and chronic pain who need the same prescription
drugs to help them live a normal life:
Unfortunately, the DEA and the doctors who treat chronic pain are not
working collaboratively to meet these important national healthcare
interests. Instead an antagonistic relationship has developed between the
DEA and doctors, where the DEA appears to think that doctors are overprescribing pain medication and doctors are trying in good faith to care for

his pain . . . Hassman made the mistake of believing her longtime patient and prescribed
Oxycodone and then OXYCONTIN for him. She was indicted for each such prescription.” Id.
142. See Butler, supra note 141.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Kaufman, supra note 6.
147. Id.
148. Id. (“Although the right to practice medicine is regulated by state boards, the right to
prescribe controlled narcotics is regulated by the DEA . . . [i]n Hassman’s case, that working
relationship became controversial . . . [because] [s]he was not told . . . that DEA agents were
watching the conversation on closed-circuit television and participating in the interview ‘by
surreptitious means.’”).
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their patients under the ever-growing fear of being accused of aiding in
unlawful drug diversion.149

Because of the threat of a jail sentence, on January 29, 2004, Dr.
Hassman “entered a guilty plea to four counts of knowingly comforting or
assisting four patients who possessed controlled drugs obtained through
misrepresentation, deception, or fraud—that is, to being an accessory after
the fact to [her] patients’ crimes.”150 In one of the cases, a pharmacist
informed Hassman that one of her patients “had filled a prescription for her
mother, also a patient, and then handed it to an unknown man in the
parking lot, who drove away.”151 The patient later told Hassman that the
man in the parking lot was the patient’s nephew.152 The other charges were
based on a patient who “admitted to possessing some drugs prescribed for
his deceased father,” a patient who said during an initial office visit that he
once possessed someone else’s prescription, and two patients who “told
[Hassman] that a certain patient had stolen part of their prescriptions.”153 In
these cases, although Dr. Hassman documented these facts in the patient’s
medical records, she did not call the police.154
On August 16, 2004, Dr. Hassman was sentenced in federal court.155
At sentencing, the judge acknowledged that she “ha[d] been punished
enough by loss of professional standing and most of her practice, as well as
the destitution resulting from her enormous legal expenses.”156 Nevertheless,
the judge believed “that a lenient sentence might be an inadequate
deterrent to the rest of the medical community.”157 While recognizing that
“some patients do need and benefit from the prescription of opioids,” he
expressed a greater concern about the “scourge of addiction” that could

149. Press Statement, Jerri Hassman, M.D. (June 26, 2003), at www.aapsonline.org/
painman/hasstatement.htm (last visited July 23, 2008).
150. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Jeri Hassman, M.D. Pleads Guilty to Not Ratting
on Patients, NEWS OF THE DAY…IN PERSPECTIVE, Jan. 31, 2004, at www.aapsonline.org/nod/
newsofday39.htm (last visited July 23, 2008). “Under the terms of the plea agreement, she
could [have been] sentenced to up to 6 months in prison or up to 5 years probation. The plea
agreement enabled her to avoid decades in jail under the sentencing guidelines had she been
convicted on any one of the 300 counts” with which she was initially charged. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Dr. Jeri Hassman Sentenced to Probation, NEWS
OF THE DAY…IN PERSPECTIVE, Aug. 18, 2004, at www.aapsonline.org/nod/newsofday83.htm
(last visited July 23, 2008).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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result if physicians did not more stringently control their prescribing
practices.158
The judge ultimately imposed a sentence that included “two years of
probation, plus 100 hours of community service, 50 in a substance abuse
center and 50 serving nonpaying patients in her office.”159 Hassman was
permitted to “reapply for her DEA certification one year after the date of the
plea agreement.”160 The judge, however, conditioned the sentence on a
requirement that she “publish in a medical journal an exemplary letter
describing the devastating consequences of her own behavior and the
righteous prosecution by government, so that others may be influenced.”161
E.

Dr. Ronald McIver

After teaching and traveling for a number of years, Ronald McIver
entered Michigan State University to become a doctor of osteopathy
(D.O.).162 He began practicing pain medicine in Florence, South Carolina,
in the late 1980s, and after declaring bankruptcy in 2000, moved to
Greenwood, South Carolina, where he opened a small storefront clinic
called the Pain Therapy Center.163 According to a news account of his case,
he was an “unusual doctor” in this day and age in that he spent significant
amounts of time with his patients—the average visit lasted an hour.164
While an apparently caring doctor, he neglected the administrative side of
his practice.165
McIver was an aggressive pain doctor, prescribing high dosages of
opioids for many of his patients, but he required his “[p]atients taking
opioids . . . to sign a pain contract and bring their pills in at each visit to be
counted.”166 McIver had concerns about whether some of his patients were
legitimate patients or were diverting their medications.167 As a result, in
February 2002, he wrote a letter to a state Board of Drug Control (BDC)
inspector, describing his suspicions.168 He ended the letter stating “‘I

158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, supra note 155.
161. Id.
162. Tina Rosenberg, Doctor or Drug Pusher?, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, §6 (Magazine),
at 48, 52.
163. Id. at 50, 52.
164. See id. at 52.
165. See id. (“While McIver’s treatment rooms were normal, his and his wife’s offices—off
limits to patients—were a mess . . . . Used syringes, for example, overflowed their storage
box.”).
166. See id. at 50, 52.
167. See Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 54.
168. Id.
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certainly don’t want to refuse help to someone who needs it. On the other
hand, I want even less to be implicated in diversion or other
improprieties.’”169 While the BDC agent did nothing with the letter, McIver
came into the DEA’s crosshairs in July 2002 when a health insurance agent
was going through files and found that one of his subscribers, Larry Shealy,
was receiving very large doses of opioids from Dr. McIver.170 The insurance
agent called the DEA.171
Larry Shealy began seeing McIver in February 2002.172 Shealy was fiftysix years old and suffered from “intense back and knee pain” and other
health problems.173 He was taking OxyContin when he first came to see
McIver but complained that his pain was still significant.174 McIver
increased the dose to a level that allowed Shealy to go back to his job in an
auto body shop.175 Shealy died in his sleep approximately fifteen months
after he started seeing McIver.176
McIver was indicted “on fifteen counts related to his treatment of ten
patients, nine of whom testified for the government at trial.”177 The tenth
patient was Larry Shealy, whose “death formed the basis of two counts of
the indictment.”178
Of the patients who testified against McIver, Leslie Smith, the patient
who prompted McIver to write the letter to the BDC, gave the most
damaging testimony.179 Smith admitted he was a drug addict and sought
out McIver to obtain painkillers after learning from one of his friends that
McIver readily gave him a prescription for pain medications.180 Smith
traveled sixty miles each way to see McIver181 and “testified that he lied to
[McIver] about pain in his wrist, but that [McIver] prescribed high doses of
OxyContin and Dilaudid, the drugs that Smith requested, without ordering xrays.”182 The prosecution presented evidence that McIver must have been
aware of Smith’s drug use as he discovered a syringe in Smith’s possession
169. Id. (quoting the February 2002 letter from McIver to Larry McElrath, a state Bureau of
Drug Control inspector).
170. Id. at 52, 54.
171. Id. at 52.
172. Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 55.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id. (stating that McIver doubled Shealy’s dose of OxyContin).
176. Id. When he died, Shealy “had OxyContin pills in his stomach” and “the levels of
drugs were consistent with the prescriptions McIver had been writing.” Id.
177. United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 553 (4th Cir. 2006).
178. Id. at 553.
179. Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 52, 54.
180. McIver, 470 F.3d at 554 (citing Joint Appendix at 175-76).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 554 (citing Joint Appendix at 178, 180-83).
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during an office visit.183 Despite this fact, after Smith told McIver that he
used the syringe for fishing, McIver continued to prescribe the drugs for
him.184
The others who testified were also either drug addicts or drug diverters
who lied to McIver about their use of the drugs.185 Apparently, the jury
believed the prosecution’s claim that McIver knew or, at least, should have
known that these individuals were abusing or diverting the drugs he
prescribed and convicted McIver of one count of conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances unlawfully,186 six counts of unlawful distribution of a
controlled substance,187 and two counts of unlawful distribution of a
controlled substance that led to Larry Shealy’s death.188 He was sentenced
to concurrently serve thirty years in prison for Shealy’s death and twenty
years for the other counts.189
A New York Times article published after the court decision raised
questions about whether Shealy’s death was related to the drugs McIver
prescribed.190 Although the prosecutor’s toxicologist concluded that the
OxyContin and Roxicodone that McIver prescribed “caused Shealy’s death
by respiratory depression,” there was evidence that Shealy had been taking
the same amount of the drugs for at least two months before he died.191
According to pain specialists, death by respiratory suppression is unlikely
when the dosage of such drugs is consistent.192 Moreover, there was also a
significant possibility that Shealy’s death might have been caused by
“advanced congestive heart failure.”193
McIver appealed the trial court decision to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit on several grounds.194 The crux of McIver’s argument was
that the jury was allowed “to convict on a civil, rather than a criminal,

183. Id. at 554 (citing Joint Appendix at 185).
184. Id. at 554-55 (citing Joint Appendix at 185).
185. See McIver, 470 F.3d at 554-57 (discussing the cases of six patients who received
prescriptions from McIver).
186. Id. at 553 (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000)).
187. Id. (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000)).
188. Id. (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) (2000)).
189. Id.
190. Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 55.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. The grounds included that the jury instructions “improperly lowered the government’s
burden of proof,” that the prosecution’s medical expert’s testimony “constituted inadmissible
legal opinions,” that “the district court erred in excluding evidence from [McIver’s] expert
witness,” and that “there was insufficient evidence to support each of his convictions.” McIver,
470 F.3d at 557.
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standard of proof.”195 Despite acknowledging that there is potential for jury
confusion as to the civil standard of care applied in medical malpractice
cases and the criminal standard of proof required in these prosecutions, the
Fourth Circuit rejected McIver’s arguments and upheld the district court’s
decision.196 Interviews with jurors after the trial, however, indicated some
confusion over the standard, with a number indicating that what was most
influential to their decision was the amount and dosages of drugs
prescribed,197 rather than knowledge or intent to divert or prescribe to feed
an addict’s habit.
III. THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT—A CLASH OF CULTURES
The scrutiny and prosecution of these physicians is a useful foundation
for an examination of the clash between a medical view regarding
appropriate prescribing of opioids for pain treatment and a law enforcement
perspective that such drugs are dangerous and have the potential for abuse
and diversion. But, these prosecutions also represent a more deep-seated
adversariness, akin to animosity, between the two groups. This animosity is
evident in the language used by each side when describing the other. War
and terrorism are major themes in the rhetoric of both sides. While
government prosecutors have long referred to their activities against drug
diversion as part of a “war on drugs,” they have also likened doctors who
prescribe large doses of opioids to terrorists, stating that they will “root
[them] out like the Taliban.”198 Pain advocates have responded in kind,
referring to the government’s efforts as “a war on pain doctors,” “a
government jihad,” and “state-sponsored terrorism.”199 Media reports add
fuel to this rhetoric, describing the DEA as using “hardball tactics,” including
“storming clinics in SWAT-style gear, ransacking offices, and hauling off
doctors in handcuffs.”200
State and federal prosecutors have also used the language of organized
crime. They have referred to arrested doctors as “being no different than

195. See id.
196. Id. at 558.
197. Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 55.
198. See Melinda Ammann, The Agony and the Ecstasy: How the OxyContin Crackdown
Hurts Patients in Pain, REASON, Apr. 2003, at 28, 33 (quoting Gene Rossi, an Alexandria,
Virginia, federal prosecutor); see also White, supra note 94 (quoting former Attorney General
John Ashcroft, who stated that “[t]he indictment and arrests in Virginia demonstrate our
commitment to bring to justice all those who traffic in this very dangerous drug . . . . We will
continue to pursue vigorously physicians, patients and others who are responsible for turning
OxyContin from a legitimate painkiller to a vehicle of addiction and death.”).
199. Frank Owen, The DEA’s War on Pain Doctors, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 5-11, 2003, at
40.
200. Id.

HOFFMANN FOR CHRISTENSEN2.DOC

2008]

MARCH 10, 2009 11:22 AM

TREATING PAIN V. REDUCING DRUG DIVERSION AND ABUSE

257

drug kingpins or crack dealers” and call their patients drug addicts.201 Pain
advocates, in contrast, refer to these doctors as pioneers and even
heroes,202 and patients as vulnerable and suffering human beings.203 The
two sides also characterize the drugs that are the focus of regulation very
differently. OxyContin, for example, is characterized by drug enforcement
officials as “a seductive, deadly menace,”204 whereas pain physicians and
patients refer to it as “a miracle drug.”205
The language of each side, in and of itself, provides evidence of the rift
between the two groups and may also illustrate the historical tension
between them and the inherent culture of each profession. Prosecutors
appear deeply distrustful of addicts or anyone using large quantities of
narcotics. That suspicion carries over to anyone willing to help an addict or
trust him. This suspicion likely results from their training and indoctrination.
In contrast, physicians talk of the need to trust their patients, to listen to
them, to prevent their pain and suffering, and to engender their trust.
Without such patient trust, they are trained to believe, they will be unable to
establish a therapeutic relationship, i.e., patients will not confide in them or
share with them information that is essential for accurate diagnosis and
treatment. In addition, physicians are trained to make independent medical
judgments and value their autonomy in this regard. Efforts by prosecutors
and regulators to determine what is a “legitimate medical purpose” invades
physicians’ exclusive turf and seriously threatens their professional integrity.
The cavernous schism between the two sides appears to prevent rational
exploration of the issue and cooperative means of dealing with the problem.
IV. THE HISTORY OF U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT RELATED TO PHYSICIAN
PRESCRIBING
The recent altercations between physicians and law enforcement agents
over the prescribing of opioids is actually part of an ongoing historical
struggle between the two groups as to what counts as the practice of
medicine and who has the authority to decide what constitutes the practice
of medicine in the context of physicians prescribing controlled substances.
The modern drug regulatory scheme has its roots in the late nineteenth

201. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 6; Markon, supra note 134.
202. See, e.g., Ralph Vartabedian, Painful Rift Unnerves Doctors: The Clash over the Use
of Opioids to Treat Patients Intensifies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2003, at A1; Owen, supra note
199.
203. See, e.g., Markon, supra note 134.
204. Ammann, supra note 198, at 30.
205. See Timothy Roche, The Potent Perils of a Miracle Drug: OxyContin is a Leading
Treatment for Chronic Pain, but Officials Fear It May Succeed Crack Cocaine on the Street,
TIME, Jan. 8, 2001, at 47.
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century, when policymakers began “to define the boundaries of appropriate
sale and use of drug products.”206 These standards were created about the
time that some medical professionals began defining drug addiction as a
disease that needed to be treated by health professionals, with some calling
for all narcotics to be banned from sale, except with medical approval.207
It was not until 1914, when Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics
Act, that federal law addressed the issue of the non-medical use of
narcotics.208 As a result of the then prevailing constitutional view that
Congress had limited power to create penal laws (because police powers
were reserved to the states), the Harrison Act was drafted simply as a tax law
requiring those authorized to manufacture and/or distribute “opium, coca
leaves and all their compounds and derivatives to register [with the local
internal revenue office], pay a fee, and keep records of all such drugs in
their possession.”209 A narcotics division was established in the U.S.
Treasury Department to enforce the law.210
The Harrison Act made possession of narcotics by any unregistered
person unlawful unless the drugs were obtained from a physician who was
registered under the Act, prescribed “in the course of his professional

206. Spillane & McAllister, supra note 12, at S5.
207. Id. at S6. In addition to balancing concerns about addiction and therapeutic benefit,
early efforts to regulate the sale of these drugs sought to address health professionals’
concerns about control of the drug supply. See id. The American Medical Association, which
had recently been established, was seeking to “control the distribution of medicines under
physicians.” Duane C. McBride et al., Alternative Perspectives on the Drug Policy Debate, in
THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 9, 11 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 1999). Large
pharmaceutical companies were being established and driven by profit rather than concerns
over the public’s health. See Spillane & McAllister, supra note 12, at S6. In addition to an
increased volume of drugs manufactured by these companies, a large quantity of “patent
medicines” was being marketed directly to consumers. See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN
DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 14-15 (3d ed. 1999). Many physicians and
pharmacists and their respective emerging trade associations (the American Medical
Association and the American Pharmaceutical Association) advocated that dispensing of
narcotics be limited to these professionals. Id. at 11, 14-15.
208. See Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(repealed 1970). Prior to that time, there was no real distinction between therapeutic and
recreational or illicit drugs. See Jeffrey Clayton Foster, The Rocky Road to a “Drug-Free
Tennessee”: A History of the Early Regulation of Cocaine and the Opiates, 1897-1913, 29 J.
SOC. HIST. 547, 547 (1996). Narcotics were widely available and could be purchased
without a physician’s prescription at local drugstores. See id. Even substances such as heroin
and barbiturates were advertised in the 1904 Sears catalog. See McBride et al., supra note
207, at 11.
209. JAMES C. WEISSMAN, DRUG ABUSE: THE LAW AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES 117 (1978);
see also MUSTO, supra note 207, at 54-68 (discussing the movement that led to the passage
of the Harrison Act).
210. See Harrison Act, § 2(a), 38 Stat. at 786.
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practice,” and kept records of the amount dispensed or distributed and the
name and address of the patient to whom the drugs were dispensed or
distributed.211 According to one author, “in effect, the Act criminalized nonmedically authorized possession, use, and distribution of opiates and
cocaine . . . [and] was the first time in the history of the United States that
criminal sanctions were being imposed upon what previously had been
considered a purely medical matter.”212
The Harrison Act afforded physicians a good deal of discretion in
prescribing narcotics for medical purposes, yet, even at that time, drug
control enforcers and physicians frequently came into conflict. As historical
expert David Musto pointed out, “legal definitions could not easily
distinguish between well-meaning overuse, use in error, and indiscriminate
dispensing that led to addiction.”213 When doctors were brought into court
on charges that they were prescribing narcotics for non-medical purposes,
they simply countered that they were practicing legitimate medicine.214
While drugs were also still being distributed by non-physicians, physicians
were a much easier target for law enforcement agents.215
A considerable point of contention after passage of the Act was the
treatment of drug addicts. Federal drug agents “opposed any form of
narcotics distribution and harassed physicians who dared to pursue narcotic
treatment efforts.”216 Many physicians, on the other hand, “felt that the
agonies of unrelieved addiction were as much encompassed in their
Hippocratic Oath as any other human suffering.”217 The question of
whether the Act allowed the treatment or maintenance of addicts was
addressed in a series of Supreme Court opinions, which seemed to vacillate
on the issue, arguably as a result of the revenue origin of the Act, but also,
perhaps, as a result of changes in the way that society viewed addicts.218
Over a six-year period starting in 1916, the Court went from viewing the Act
as not preventing physicians from prescribing to addicts, as it was simply a

211. Id.
212. WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 117.
213. MUSTO, supra note 207, at 92.
214. Id. at 93-94.
215. See, e.g., id. at 94 (“Professionals could be made to conform to law much more
effectively than unlicensed peddlers or pushers.”).
216. WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 118.
217. Rufus G. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the
Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 736, 739 (1953).
218. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 132-34 (discussing the “change in judicial outlook
between 1915 and 1919 with regard to addiction maintenance”).
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revenue act,219 to saying that prescribing to an addict “for the purpose of
providing the user with morphine sufficient to keep him comfortable by
maintaining his customary use” was not in the “course of professional
treatment,”220 to adopting a view that professional practice did not include
medication for the purpose of curing an addict.221
These Supreme Court “cases clearly established that registered
physicians were permitted to prescribe and dispense narcotic drugs strictly
within the bounds of their professional practice”222 and that maintenance
therapy for addicts was not within such bounds. They set the stage for
“practitioner investigations and prosecutions for years to come.”223
According to Rufus King, an early anti-drug law advocate, starting in the
1920s, “the Narcotics Division launched a reign of terror, threatening
219. See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916) (affirming the district court’s
decision to quash an indictment against Dr. Jin Fuey Moy for prescribing morphine to an
addict).
220. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1919); see also United States v.
Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 90 (1919) (upholding the conviction of a doctor whose indictment
charged that the defendant physician sold “five hundred one-sixth grain tablets of heroin not
in the course of the regular professional practice . . . and not for the treatment of any disease
from which [his patient] was suffering but as was well known by [the defendant], [his patient]
was addicted to the use of the drug as a habit, being a person popularly known as a ‘dope
fiend,’ and that [the defendant sold] . . . the drug, heroin, to [his patient] for the purpose of
gratifying his appetite for the drug”).
221. See United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 286 (1922) (“[D]efendant did not
dispense any of the drugs for the purpose of treating any disease or condition other than
[morphine, heroin, or cocaine] addiction.”(emphasis added)); see also King, supra note 217,
at 743 (asserting that the Solicitor General issued a trick indictment broadening the case to
include “whether the so-called ‘ambulatory treatment’ of drug addicts by a physician is or is
not, as a matter of law, prohibited by section 2 of the Harrison Narcotic Act.” (quoting Brief on
Behalf of the United States at 7, Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, No. 582 (1922)).
222. Stephen E. Stone, The Investigation and Prosecution of Professional Practice Cases
Under the Controlled Substances Act: Introduction to Professional Practice Case Law and
Investigations, 10 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 21, 22 (1983).
223. Id. The change in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act is attributed in part to
“radical social change.” Aryeh Y. Brown, Comment, In Memoriam: Ralph Seeley, Obscured
by Smoke: Medicinal Marijuana and the Need for Representation Reinforcement Review, 22
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 210 (1998) (citing MUSTO, supra note 207, at 132). Between the
initial and second Jin Fuey Moy decisions, “[t]he country underwent profound changes . . . .
World War I had been fought, the Eighteenth Amendment had been adopted in a spirit of
moralistic fervor, ‘and the liberalizing movements of La-Follette, Theodore Roosevelt, and
Wilson had declined into a fervent and intolerant nationalism.’” Id. (quoting MUSTO, supra
note 207, at 132-33). In addition, there was
an enormous fear of Bolsheviks and anarchists which gave rise to the Red Scare of
1919-20. Narcotics came to be associated with perversion and rebellion, addiction
was perceived as a threat to the war effort and to the nation, and maintenance of
addicts in clinics or by individual physicians was considered immoral and unpatriotic.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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doctors who had anything further to do with drug addicts, and sending a
goodly number of recalcitrant practitioners off to prison.”224 Yet, these
offenders often were respected members of the community and the “ratio
between arrests and convictions remained notably low, indicating abusive
use of the indictment processes.”225
During the time that these cases were making their way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, addicts continued to be treated in “morphine maintenance
clinics.”226 However, in the early 1920s, largely in response to a “global
moral crusade” the clinics were forced to close, and addicts were left to seek
out sympathetic individual physicians or obtain their drugs illegally, on the
street through a thriving black market.227 Then, in 1925, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in Linder v. United States228 that physicians could prescribe
narcotics to assist addicts in withdrawal as long as they did so in
conformance with accepted medical practice.229 In Linder, a physician who
was registered under the Act gave a patient, who the government argued
the physician knew was addicted to narcotics, one tablet of morphine and
three tablets of cocaine.230 At issue was whether the physician was
dispensing the drugs within the bounds of his professional practice.231 The
physician argued that what is meant by “in the course of . . . professional

224. RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG UP: AMERICA’S FIFTY-YEAR FOLLY 43 (1974).
225. Id. at 44. “[I]n 1920, 3,477 arrests produced 908 convictions; in 1921, 4,014
arrests produced 1,583; at the peak, in 1925, 10,297 federal arrests produced 5,600
convictions.” Id.
226. See WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 117.
227. Id. at 117-18.
228. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
229. Id. at 22. The petitioner alleged that prior to this case, the lower courts had, “without
any sufficient reason,” “engrafted” onto the exception of the Act (that a physician who
dispenses or distributes narcotics in the course of his professional practice need not prescribe
on an official form) “the further requirement that the dispensing or distribution must . . . have
been . . . in good faith as a medicine, and not to satisfy the cravings of an addict.” Brief of
Petitioner at 8, Linder, 268 U.S. 5, No. 183 (1924).
230. 268 U.S. at 11, 15-16. According to one source,
Dr. Charles O. Linder, completing a lifetime of honorable practice in Spokane,
Washington, was induced by one of Treasury’s addict stool-pigeons to write a
prescription for four tablets of cocaine and morphine. (At the trial the doctor claimed
she told him she was in great pain from a stomach ailment, and that her regular
physician was unavailable; she swore she had disclosed to him that she was a drug
addict.) Several Treasury agents thereupon descended on his office on a Saturday
afternoon, stomped through his waiting room crowded with patients, and broke in on
him in the midst of a consultation. After a rough-and-tumble search of the premises,
they dragged him off to jail.
KING, supra note 224, at 44-45.
231. Linder, 268 U.S. at 17, 22-23.
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practice . . . cannot be answered by the application of any hard and fast
rule” and that
[i]t is the business of the physician to alleviate the pain and suffering of
patients as well as to effectuate their cure. If we are to believe the literature
on the subject, the suffering of an addict caused by deprivation of his
customary drug is as intense as any suffering caused by disease. It is
perhaps more so in the insistent demand for relief. Why should not the
physician in the course of his ordinary practice take cognizance of that fact
and administer temporary relief? Why should the law be construed as
intended to prohibit such an act of mercy? It is, we submit, a strained
construction of the law to hold that the language in question was intended
to prohibit such an act . . . .232

The Court ultimately confirmed its earlier interpretation that the Act must
be construed and applied as a revenue act.233 In addition, the Court took
the opportunity to limit the holding of its prior rulings on this issue, stating
that earlier opinions “cannot be accepted as authority for holding that a
physician, who acts bona fide and according to fair medical standards, may
never give an addict moderate amounts of drugs for self-administration in
order to relieve conditions incident to addiction.”234
Despite the ruling in Linder, federal narcotics agents “continued to
vigorously and indiscriminately investigate all physicians prescribing
narcotics to addicts.”235 Addiction continued to be viewed as a “vice” rather
than as a treatable disease and certain drugs were “stripped of their healing
properties.”236 Physicians, even those prescribing within legal bounds,
became fearful of narcotics agents. According to Musto, “[t]he social and
economic position of the registered physician was so sensitive, trials so timeconsuming, and appeals so long and costly, that hostile agents could make
cases against physicians with impunity and nearly ruin them whether charges
were warranted or not.”237
In the 1930s, controversy remained over the treatment of addicts from
both a medical and legal perspective and the regulation of narcotics

232. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 229, at 11.
233. See Linder, 268 U.S. at 22-23 (“We find no facts alleged in the indictment sufficient
to show that petitioner had done anything falling within definite inhibitions or sufficient
materially to imperil orderly collection of revenue from sales. . . . The unfortunate condition of
the recipient certainly created no reasonable probability that she would sell or otherwise
dispose of the few tablets intrusted to her; and we cannot say that by so dispensing them the
doctor necessarily transcended the limits of that professional conduct with which Congress
never intended to interfere.”).
234. Id. at 22.
235. WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 118.
236. Brown, supra note 223, at 212.
237. MUSTO, supra note 207, at 185.
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expanded.238 In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was established
under the Treasury Department’s control,239 and in 1932, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, a model for state legislatures that criminalized
the possession, use, and distribution of opiates and cocaine.240 The model
ultimately was adopted by every state in some form and increased uniformity
among state laws.241
From 1930 to the late 1960s, federal drug policy was largely a matter
for the police and was enforced by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.242
Then, in 1968 Congress established the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, replacing the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.243 It was
housed in the Justice Department, rather than the Treasury, and was
assigned responsibility for enforcement of the federal drug laws.244 The shift
in the department housing the enforcement agency symbolized a shift in
policy from a tax- to a regulatory-based perspective.
In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),245
which is the modern day tool used to regulate narcotics and other controlled
substances.246 It was also the beginning of President Nixon’s “war on
drugs,” a war that continues today247 and is the root of current tensions
between physicians treating pain and the government. The CSA replaced
the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 but is broader in scope, regulating both
238. See WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 118.
239. Act of June 14, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-357, 46 Stat. 585.
240. UNIFORM NARCOTIC DRUG ACT (1932), reprinted in WILLIAM BUTLER ELDRIDGE,
NARCOTICS AND THE LAW: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT IN NARCOTIC DRUG
CONTROL app. A, at 161, 163-64 (2d ed. rev. 1967).
241. WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 118-19.
242. DAVID F. MUSTO & PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL: POLITICS AND
FEDERAL POLICY IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING SUBSTANCE ABUSE, 1963-1981, at x (2002).
243. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 240. This new agency was a consolidation of the
prior Bureau of Narcotics (formerly located in the Treasury Department) and the Bureau of
Drug Abuse Control (formerly located in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare).
Id.
244. Id. at 240-41.
245. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000)).
246. Controlled substances covered by the CSA are drugs that have the potential for abuse
and dependence. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (including the potential for abuse and dependence in
the descriptions of each of the five “schedules” of drugs the CSA covers).
247. Robert Pavlan, The Federal Controlled Substances Act, PHARMACY L. UPDATE (Ne. Univ.
Bouvé Coll. of Health Sci., Sch. of Pharmacy, Continuing Educ., Boston, Ma.), 2002, at 1;
see DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: A TRADITION OF
EXCELLENCE, 1973-2003, at 13-14, available at www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/
history_part1.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2008); see also MUSTO, supra note 207, at 248-50
(discussing Nixon’s war on drugs).
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narcotic and non-narcotic substances (e.g., barbiturates, amphetamines,
and anabolic steroids).248 The CSA and its attendant regulations provide for
intensive record keeping and tracking of all organizations and individuals
involved in the distribution of controlled substances.249 The CSA is
administered and enforced by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
which was established in 1973 and is a unit of the FBI within the U.S.
Department of Justice.250
The CSA classifies controlled substances into one of five schedules
based on their potential for abuse, psychological or physiological
dependence, and medical uses.251 Schedule I drugs are substances which
have a high potential for abuse and no current medical use.252 They
include substances such as heroin, LSD, marijuana,253 and
methaqualone.254 Schedule II substances, which also have a high potential
for abuse, have a currently accepted use in medical treatment but are, in
general, accepted for medical use only with severe restrictions.255 This
group includes morphine, cocaine, methadone, oxycodone, and injectable
forms of methamphetamine.256 Several of these drugs are used to control
chronic and/or acute pain.257 Schedules III–V substances have a potential
for abuse which is lower than substances in Schedules I and II but also have

248. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 255; WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 124. Also,
unlike the Harrison Narcotics Act, which was based on the federal government’s taxing power,
the CSA is based on the federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Early
constitutional attacks on the statute were unsuccessful, and the “federal courts have upheld
Congress’ authority to enact the statute based on its power to regulate interstate commerce.”
Pavlan, supra note 247, at 1.
249. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-830 (2000) (“Part C - Registration of Manufacturers,
Distributors, and Dispensers of Controlled Substances”); Pavlan, supra note 247, at 7-9.
250. Pavlan, supra note 247, at 2; see DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 247, at 7,
9, 13-14.
251. Pavlan, supra note 247, at 1-2; see 21 U.S.C. § 812 (defining the five schedules and
requiring annual updates to be republished at 21 C.F.R. § 1308).
252. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); see MUSTO, supra note 207, at 255.
253. Although “[t]he use of medical marijuana has been approved by voter referendum in
several western states . . . [u]nder federal law, marijuana has never been proven safe and
effective for use in the treatment of any medical condition [and] [i]t is still listed as a Schedule I
controlled substance.” Pavlan, supra note 247, at 10.
254. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 Schedule I (2008).
255. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2); see also MUSTO, supra note 207, at 255 (stating that
“Schedule Two contains the most dangerous prescribable drugs”).
256. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12 Schedule II (2008).
257. See Marcia L. Meldrum, A Capsule History of Pain Management, 290 JAMA 2470,
2474 (2003); MUSTO, supra note 207, at 255.
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acceptable medical uses.258 Drugs in each Schedule are subject to different
rules for prescribing and distribution.259
Along with the Schedule structure, the CSA requires practitioners who
prescribe a substance contained in the five schedules to register with the
Attorney General.260 Only registrants acting in compliance with the law are
excepted from the criminal provisions of the Act which make it “unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to . . . distribute, or dispense, . . .
a controlled substance.”261 Because these substances are necessary for
treatment of many patients, virtually all practicing physicians register with the
DEA.
Physicians prescribing controlled substances must do so in accordance
with the regulations governing registrants. These regulations require that
prescriptions of controlled substances “must be . . . for a legitimate medical
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice.”262 Since the CSA was enacted, courts, in numerous
cases, have struggled with applying this language.263 Early cases continued
to deal with the treatment of addicts, particularly the prescribing of
methadone, and whether prescribing was being done for purposes of pain
relief or “under the guise of a ‘detoxification program.’”264 Whether
prescribing for addiction treatment was for a “legitimate medical purpose”
was largely dealt with by the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act’s passage in
1974.265 The Act responded to the widespread use, at the time, of
methadone to treat heroin addiction and “the unique and unusually great
risks of diversion and criminal profiteering associated with maintenance
programs.”266 While clear guidelines were developed for the prescribing of

258. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3)-(5); see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.13-1308.15 (2008).
259. 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-830 (2000) (“Part C - Registration of Manufacturers, Distributors,
and Dispensers of Controlled Substances). For example, prescriptions may not be written for
Schedule I substances. Prescribing regulations for the drugs in the other groups specify
requirements for refilling prescriptions, oral prescriptions, partial filling of prescriptions, and
labeling of substances prescribed. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 (2008).
260. 21 U.S.C. § 823.
261. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
262. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2008).
263. See S. REP. NO. 93-192, at 7-9 (1973) (reporting on the Methadone Diversion
Control Act of 1973, S. 1115, 93d Cong. (1973)).
264. Id. at 7.
265. See id. at 11. Shortly after passing the CSA, Congress passed the Narcotic Addict
Treatment Act of 1974 (NATA), which established a mechanism for treating addicts outside the
mainstream practice of medicine. Pub. L. No. 93-281, 88 Stat. 124 (1974).
266. S. REP. NO. 93-192, at 12. The Act was a response to a new development in medical
treatment, i.e., “the widespread use of the narcotic drug methadone both to detoxify and to
maintain heroin addicts.” Id. at 11. Under NATA and its implementing regulations,
practitioners who wish to administer and dispense methadone “for maintenance and
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narcotics to treat addiction, similar guidelines do not exist for prescribing of
pain medications to treat chronic pain, creating an environment of
uncertainty and legal risk for physicians treating this population.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE USE OF OPIOIDS FOR TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN
Opium was regarded as a virtual panacea by the medical profession
throughout much of the nineteenth century.267 The drug had many uses,268
but “it was particularly prized for its analgesic properties because of the lack
of alternative pain-relieving agents at this time.”269
While opioids were used regularly in hospitals to relieve acute pain due
to injury or surgery, they were not used for pain of longer duration until
relatively recently.270 The modern use of opioids for pain treatment arising
from disease grew out of the hospice movement of the 1960s, when it was
established that opioids were highly effective in treating cancer pain.271 This
movement was largely limited to terminally ill patients, but the use of opioids
outside the hospice setting began to permeate more traditional medical
practices as evidence began to mount that people in pain who received
opioids did not become addicted to them.272 In the late 1980s, opioids had

detoxification treatment must obtain a separate DEA registration as a Narcotic Treatment
Program.” OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL: AN
INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 23 (2006), available at
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/pract_manual012508.pdf (last visited July
23, 2008). More recently, Congress passed the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000,
allowing physicians who obtain a waiver and certification in addiction from a designated
medical specialty board to treat opioid addiction or dependence by prescribing buprenorphine
drug products. See Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, §§ 35013502, 114 Stat. 1222, 1222-27 (2000) (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(g), 824 (2000)).
267. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 1.
268. Id. Prior to the late 1800s, opioids had been used as a “soothe-all” for all types of
medical problems, from spasms, restlessness, and allergies to depression. See id. at 75. It
was only after newer approaches to medical treatment became available that wide ranging
uses of opium became understood as “unscientific, unprofessional, and an indulgence fraught
with danger.” Id.
269. Foster, supra note 208, at 548.
270. See Kaufman, supra note 6 (“Until the mid-1980s, the law enforcement concern
trumped the therapeutic value, and opioids were not widely used outside hospitals.”).
271. See Meldrum, supra note 257, at 2473 (describing the “Formation of the Pain
Field”).
272. See Randal D. France et al., Long-Term Use of Narcotic Analgesics in Chronic Pain,
19 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1379, 1380-81 (1984); William E. Hurwitz, Pain Control in the Police
State of Medicine (Part II), 8 J. AM. PHYS. & SURGEONS 13, 13 (2003) (“Beginning in the mid1980s, there was a reconsideration of the previous rejection of opioid therapy for nonmalignant pain. Encouraging clinical experience with chronic opioid administration to cancer
patients and to methadone-maintained addicts dispelled fears of this therapeutic modality . . .
. Early research indicated that patients without a prior history of addiction ran little risk of
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become the standard of care for treatment of moderate to severe cancer
It was not until 1990, however, when the World Health
pain.273
Organization published guidelines on cancer pain treatment,274 that the
standard was more widely acknowledged. Subsequently, in 1992, the
American Pain Society published Principles on Analgesic Medication for
Acute Pain and Cancer Pain,275 and in 1994, the Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research (now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ)), established that opioids, in combination with other medications,
were the appropriate treatment for chronic malignant pain.276
In 1996, for the first time, professional groups addressed guidelines for
the treatment of chronic nonmalignant pain. The American Academy of
Pain Medicine and the American Pain Society jointly issued a statement
entitled The Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic Pain (also referred
to as the “Consensus Statement”).277 The Consensus Statement “provided
guidance for regulatory agencies for determining accepted principles of
practice for the use of opioids for chronic pain patients” and “indicated that
in initially evaluating a patient a complete history and physical examination
should be conducted.”278
Moreover, the Consensus Statement
recommended that physicians develop an individualized treatment plan
including “different types of treatment modalities” and that in certain cases
“[c]onsultation with a specialist in pain medicine or with a psychologist may
becoming addicted through pain treatment with opioids.”); Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M.
Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN
171, 184 (1986) (concluding that “opioid medications can be safely and effectively
prescribed to selected patients with relatively little risk of producing the maladaptive behaviors
which define opioid abuse. . . . [H]owever, this course must be pursued cautiously.”); Jane
Porter & Hershel Jick, Letter to the Editor, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics,
302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123 (1980); see also Richard M. Marks & Edward J. Sachar,
Undertreatment of Medical Inpatients with Narcotic Analgesics, 78 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
173 (1973) (concluding that misconceptions about effective doses of narcotic analgesics and
exaggeration of the dangers of addiction lead to undertreatment of and needless suffering in
medical inpatients); see generally John P. Morgan, American Opiophobia: Customary
Underutilization of Opioid Analgesics, 5 ADVANCES ALCOHOL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE 163 (1985).
273. Hurwitz, supra note 272, at 13.
274. EXPERT COMM. ON CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND ACTIVE SUPPORTIVE CARE, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 804: CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND PALLIATIVE CARE (1990).
275. See AM. PAIN SOC’Y, PRINCIPLES OF ANALGESIC USE IN THE TREATMENT OF ACUTE PAIN
AND CANCER PAIN (3d ed. 1992).
276. See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE NO. 9: MANAGEMENT OF CANCER PAIN (1994).
277. See AM. ACAD. OF PAIN MED. & AM. PAIN SOC’Y, THE USE OF OPIOIDS FOR THE
TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN (1996), available at www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/
455/opioidschronicpain.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) [hereinafter CONSENSUS STATEMENT].
278. Paul W. Saxton, Continuation of Registration, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,073, 25,075 (Drug
Enforcement Admin. May 10, 1999); see CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 277, at 3.
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be warranted.”279 Of significant note, the Consensus Statement also
provided that “[t]he management of pain in patients with a history of
addiction or a comorbid psychiatric disorder requires special consideration,
but does not necessarily contraindicate the use of opioids.”280
In 1998, the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) issued Model
Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain.281
These Guidelines give clear direction to physicians and to state medical
boards regarding opioid use for chronic pain. Like the Consensus
Statement, the Guidelines require a physician evaluating a pain patient to
take a complete medical history and conduct a physical examination.282
They also require the physician to set a written treatment plan with
objectives, to conduct reasonable follow-ups to continue or modify therapy,
to comply with applicable controlled substance laws and regulations, and to
document everything accurately and completely.283 Moreover, “[w]hen a
physician determines that a patient is at risk for medication abuse or has a
history of substance abuse, the guidelines suggest a written agreement
between the physician and patient outlining patient responsibilities.”284 After
1998, many state medical boards adopted policies consistent with the
FSMB’s Model Guidelines.285
While the 1990s became the decade in which the medical profession
began to recognize the benefits of opioids for the treatment of chronic pain

279. Paul W. Saxton, Continuation of Registration, 64 Fed. Reg. at 25,075; see
CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 277, at 3.
280. CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 277, at 3.
281. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN, available at www.nsmadocs.org/pdf/
ModelGuidelines.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008).
282. Id. at SECTION II(1) EVALUATION OF THE PATIENT.
283. Id. at TREATMENT PLAN, PERIODIC REVIEW, MEDICAL RECORDS, COMPLIANCE WITH
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES LAWS AND REGULATIONS.
284. Larry K. Houck, The Drug Enforcement Administration, Controlled Substances and
Pain Management, 1 DEA- INDUSTRY COMMUNICATOR: SPECIAL OXYCONTIN ISSUE (Drug
Enforcement Admin., Wash. D.C.), 2001, at 10, 13.
285. See PAIN & POL’Y STUDIES GROUP, UNIV. OF WIS. PAUL P. CARBONE COMPREHENSIVE
CANCER CTR., ACHIEVING BALANCE IN FEDERAL AND STATE PAIN POLICY: A GUIDE TO EVALUATION,
at SECTION III: BACKGROUND ABOUT PAIN RELIEF AND PUBLIC POLICY- STATE POLICIES ARE
CHANGING, Fig.1 (2007), available at www.painpolicy.wisc.edu/Achieving_Balance/
EG2007.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) (illustrating the increasing number of state painspecific policies); see also FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., MODEL POLICY FOR THE USE
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN, at INTRODUCTION n.1 (2004),
available at www.fsmb.org/pdf/2004_grpol_Controlled_Substances.pdf (last visited July 23,
2008) (“As of January 2004, 22 of 70 state medical boards have policy, rules, regulations or
statutes reflecting the Federation’s Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for
the Treatment of Pain and two (2) states have formally endorsed the Model Guidelines.”).

HOFFMANN FOR CHRISTENSEN2.DOC

2008]

MARCH 10, 2009 11:22 AM

TREATING PAIN V. REDUCING DRUG DIVERSION AND ABUSE

269

and developed guidelines for their use,286 it was also a decade in which
great public attention was brought to bear on the fact that pain, both
cancer-related and non-malignant chronic pain, was being woefully
undertreated in the United States.287 Between 1999 and 2004, in line with
the “sea change” in attitudes toward pain treatment, two state medical
boards disciplined physicians for failure to adequately prescribe pain
medication for their patients.288 On the heels of the second disciplinary
action, in 2004, the FSMB provided physicians with an additional incentive
to adequately treat pain by updating its Guidelines and issuing a Model
Policy for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain.289 The
new policy went “beyond attempting to reassure physicians that they [would]
not be sanctioned for prescribing large doses of pain medication if

286. See, e.g., Sheldon L. Burchman & Paul S. Pagel, Implementation of a Formal
Treatment Agreement for Outpatient Management of Chronic Nonmalignant Pain with Opioid
Analgesics, 10 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 556, 557, 561 nn.4-14 (1995) (listing studies from
1982-1992 that recommended various approaches to treating chronic nonmalignant pain
with opioids).
287. See, e.g., Charles S. Cleeland, Editorial, Undertreatment of Cancer Pain in Elderly
Patients, 279 JAMA 1914, 1915 (1998) (“Ample evidence indicates that patients, their
families, and the public are becoming less tolerant of poor pain management.”); Sullum,
supra note 104, at 23.
288. See Sandy Kleffman, Doctor Disciplined over Pain Treatment, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2004, at A3 [hereinafter Kleffman, Doctor Disciplined over Pain Treatment]. In 1999,
the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners disciplined Dr. Paul Bilder for failure to prescribe
adequate pain relief medication. Ellen Goodman, Op-Ed., From Oregon, a Call for
Compassionate Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1999, at A19. Bilder was cited for several
infractions including prescribing only Tylenol for a terminally ill cancer patient’s pain and
prescribing insufficient pain medication for a hospice patient. Id. The Board ordered Bilder to
complete an educational program on pain treatment and on physician-patient communication
and to undergo a mental health examination. S. Van McCrary, Discipline of Oregon
Physician for Undertreating Pain Is an Appropriate Response to a Serious Problem, HEALTH L.
PERSP., Sept. 21, 1999, at www.law.uh.edu/Healthlaw/perspectives/Bioethics/990921
Discipline.html (last visited July 23, 2008). In March 2003, the Medical Board of California
filed a complaint against Dr. Eugene Whitney for failure to adequately treat the pain of Lester
Tomlinson, a terminally ill lung cancer patient. Sandy Kleffman, Suit Filed over Pain Treatment
of Ill Man, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at A1. In January 2004, Dr. Whitney
accepted a public reprimand from the Medical Board, and he was required to complete a
forty-hour pain management course, undergo a physical and mental health assessment and a
clinical and communication skills assessment. Kleffman, Doctor Disciplined over Pain
Treatment, supra.
289. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., supra note 285; see also Diane E. Hoffmann,
The Use of Opioid Analgesics: Legal and Regulatory Issues, in COMPLICATIONS IN REGIONAL
ANESTHESIA & PAIN MEDICINE 353, 354 Box 34-1, 355 (Joseph M. Neal & James P. Rathmell
eds., 2007) (discussing the key elements of the FSMB 2004 update to the Model Guidelines).
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appropriate” and sent “a message that undertreatment of pain [could] be
considered substandard care.”290
These actions by medical specialty groups and state medical boards
came together to encourage physicians to more appropriately and more
aggressively treat their patients’ pain. As a result, many physicians began to
prescribe opioids in much larger doses than they had in the past.291
Many pain experts now assert that there is no upper limit of safety for
opioid dosages. They believe that “[a]s long as the dose is [started] low and
increased gradually, large doses [may] be taken [and are] limited only by
adverse [side] effects.”292 Unlike non-opioid analgesics, opioids do not
cause damage to major organs.293 The correct amount, they argue, is what
reduces or eliminates the patient’s pain without unacceptable side effects.294
Side effects can include “sedation, respiratory depression, nausea, vomiting,
itching, urinary retention, and constipation.”295 Often patients develop a
tolerance relatively quickly to sedation, respiratory depression, nausea, and
vomiting so that they do not experience these negative effects.296
Despite this view that many pain treatment experts have regarding the
use of opioids for the treatment of pain, others, including many at the DEA,
believe that “there is a difference of opinion [in] the medical profession
regarding the use of opioids in the management of chronic pain, with two
differing approaches classified as the therapeutic school . . . and the
dependency school.”297 Those in the therapeutic school believe that “the
measure of successful treatment of a chronic pain patient is whether the
patient has experienced an increase in his/her level of comfort and function

290. Hoffmann, supra note 289, at 355.
291. During the past decade, medical prescribing practices regarding chronic pain
diagnoses in this country have undergone dramatic change. More physicians are prescribing
Schedule II narcotics to a larger number of patients, and the dosages prescribed to these
patients have increased markedly. See, e.g., Joan Arehart-Treichel, Opioid Prescribing May
Be Increasing, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Apr. 20, 2007, at 38; Bridget M. Kuehn, Opioid
Prescriptions Soar: Increase in Legitimate Use as Well as Abuse, 297 JAMA 249, 251 (2007).
292. Jennifer P. Schneider, Rational Use of Opioid Analgesics in Chronic Musculoskeletal
Pain, 23 J. MUSCULOSKELETAL MED. 145, 146 (2006); see also CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra
note 277, at 2 (stating that “for most opioids, there does not appear to be an arbitrary upper
dosage limit, as was previously thought”).
293. See Schneider, supra note 292, at 146 (“Unlike acetaminophen, aspirin, and many
other drugs, opioid analgesics do not have any specific organ toxicity.”).
294. Id. at 146.
295. Hussam Antoin & Ralph D. Beasley, Opioids for Chronic Noncancer Pain: Tailoring
Therapy to Fit the Patient and the Pain, 116 POSTGRADUATE MED. 37, 38 (2006).
296. See id.
297. Paul W. Saxton, Continuation of Registration, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,073, 25,074 (Drug
Enforcement Admin. May 10, 1999).
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and has an improved quality of life.”298 They assert that the number of pills
consumed is not the appropriate measure and that a physician has to trust
the patient’s reporting of pain and individualize his or her treatment.299
Those in the dependency school believe that there is a significant risk of
drug addiction in the long-term use of high doses of opioids; therefore, it is
not appropriate to prescribe in this manner.300
Law enforcement officials appear to believe that patients complaining of
pain who need large volumes of medication often are either addicts or
diverters and, therefore, prescribing to them is not a legitimate medical
purpose.301 The definition of “addict” in the Controlled Substances Act
includes “any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to
endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare.”302 Experts argue
that equating chronic pain patients with addicts “ignores the medical fact”
that a very small percentage “of chronic pain patients are addicted and
represent[] no threat to public safety and morality.”303 Moreover, this
definition ignores the possibility that some addicts are in physical pain (other
than that caused by withdrawal) and need medication to treat their pain.
The debate, in large part, appears to turn on the actual risk of opioid
addiction. As long as doctors have administered narcotics, they have been
worried about their patients becoming addicted to the drugs. Their worries
were often due to a misunderstanding of the differences between addiction,
tolerance, and dependence.304 Tolerance results when exposure to a drug
leads to a reduction in one or more of the drug’s intended effects over time
so that an increased dose may be required to maintain the same
physiological effects.305 Physical dependence is a condition manifested by
withdrawal symptoms when a drug is abruptly terminated or reduced in
dose.306 Addiction, in contrast, is a condition resulting in “impaired control
298. Id. at 25,074-75.
299. See id. at 25,075.
300. See id. at 20,074 (stating that physicians “should start with the most benign
medications at the least dose and increase the dose or change the medication as needed . . .
[because] increasing dosage levels may not be appropriate if the pain is not responding to the
opioids” ).
301. Ronald T. Libby, The DEA’s OxyContin Action Plan: An Unproven Drug Epidemic, PAIN
RELIEF NETWORK, Dec. 16, 2003, at www.painreliefnetwork.org/prn/the-deas-oxycontin-actionplan-an-unproven-drug-epidemic.php (last visited July 23, 2008).
302. 21 U.S.C. § 802(1) (2000).
303. Libby, supra note 301.
304. AM. ACAD. OF PAIN MED., AM. PAIN SOC’Y & AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED.,
DEFINITIONS RELATED TO THE USE OF OPIOIDS FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN 1 (2001), available at
www.painmed.org/pdf/definition.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) [hereinafter DEFINITIONS
RELATED TO THE USE OF OPIOIDS FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN].
305. Id. at 3.
306. Id.
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over drug use, compulsive use, continued use despite harm, and
craving.”307
While most individuals receiving opioid therapy do develop physical
dependence,308 a number of studies have confirmed that
patients treated with narcotics rarely become addicts. In 1980 researchers
at Boston University Medical Center reported that they had reviewed the
records of 11,882 hospital patients treated with narcotics and found “only
four cases of reasonably well documented addiction in patients who had no
history of addiction.” A 1982 study of 10,000 burn victims who had
received narcotic injections, most of them for weeks or months, found no
cases of drug abuse that could be attributed to pain treatment. In a 1986
study of 38 chronic pain patients who were treated with opioids for years,
only two became addicted, and both had histories of drug abuse.309

A 1993 article in a newsletter issued by the National Institute on Drug Abuse
stated that opioids “are rarely abused when used for medical purposes.”310
The 1996 Consensus Statement from the American Academy of Pain
Medicine and the American Pain Society asserts that “[m]isunderstanding of
addiction and mislabeling of patients as addicts result in unnecessary
withholding of opioid medications” and notes that “[s]tudies indicate that the
de novo development of addiction when opioids are used for the relief of
pain is low.”311 Moreover, the two professional societies agree “that known
addicts can benefit from the carefully supervised, judicious use of opioids for
the treatment of pain due to cancer, surgery, or recurrent painful illnesses
such as sickle cell disease.”312
While the large majority of medical experts agree that most pain patients
can successfully use narcotics without negative consequences, some
acknowledge that a good deal “remains unknown about the number or
types of chronic pain sufferers who will become addicted as a result of
medical care, or ‘iatrogenically’ addicted.”313 According to one article, “the
307. Id.
308. See id. at 3.
309. Sullum, supra note 104, at 24.
310. See id. at 25 (quoting a 1993 newsletter article from the National Institute on Drug
Abuse, National Institutes of Health).
311. CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 277, at 2.
312. Id.
313. Barry Meier, The Delicate Balance of Pain and Addiction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003,
at F1; see also Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg.
52,716, 52,718 n.20 (Sept. 6, 2006) (“Further controlled trials [should] be conducted on
opioid therapy in patients with chronic noncancer pain in an effort to identify best practice with
regard to selection of both medication and treatment regimens [to] identify patient
characteristics that predict opioid responsiveness [and to] provide support for guidelines on
appropriate precautions, contraindications, and the degree of monitoring required in such
patients.”) (quoting AM. MED. ASS’N, DIRECTIVES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES: D-120.999
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biggest risk appears to be to patients who have abused drugs or to those
who have an underlying, undiagnosed vulnerability to abuse substances, a
condition that may affect an estimated 3 to 14 percent of the
population.”314 There is also uncertainty about the best way to treat
substance abusers who are also afflicted with chronic pain.315
In the midst of the debate over the addictive potential of long-term and
high doses of opioids, a renewed concern about drug diversion, in light of
the availability and abuse associated with OxyContin, appeared in the late
90s and has continued through the present.316 OxyContin “is a 12-hour,
timed-release form of oxycodone, a synthetic opioid that has long been
available in products such as Percocet, Percodan, and Tylox.”317 By the
early 2000s, the drug had become the most prescribed Schedule II narcotic
in the country.318 As the DEA and state drug enforcement officials found
evidence of diversion of the drug from legitimate users to addicts, they
began to scrutinize physicians and pharmacists who prescribed and
dispensed large doses of the drug.319 They were able to link OxyContin to a
number of overdose deaths, pharmacy robberies, and other criminal
activities.320

USE OF OPIOIDS IN CHRONIC NONCANCER PAIN) (alterations in original); Jane C. Ballantyne &
Jianren Mao, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1943, 1948 fig.2,
1951 (2003) (stating that “it is widely acknowledged that there is a link between previous drug
or alcohol abuse and addiction to opioids prescribed for pain”).
314. Meier, supra note 313; see also Antoin & Beasley, supra note 295, at 39 (citing
Savage who used “population studies to estimate the risk of addiction at 3% to 16% in the
general population” and suggesting that currently a “10% incidence of addiction is probably
the best estimate to discuss with patients when initiating opioid treatment”).
315. See Meier, supra note 313.
316. Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of
Physician Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
21, 21 (2003).
317. Ammann, supra note 198, at 30.
318. Id.; U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., PUB’N NO. DEA-02017, DRUG INTELLIGENCE
BRIEF, OXYCONTIN: PHARMACEUTICAL DIVERSION, at BACKGROUND (2002), available at
www.avitarinc.com/pdf/Drug-Intelligence-Brief-Oxycotine-Facts.pdf (last visited July 23,
2008).
319. See U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 318, at DIVERSION AND
DISTRIBUTION.
320. See id. “From 1996 to 1999, the number of drug abuse deaths reported to [the
Drug Abuse Warning Network] that involved oxycodone more than quadrupled, with 268
deaths in 1999 compared to 51 in 1996.” Id. at BACKGROUND.
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VI. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ARREST AND PROSECUTION OF PHYSICIANS FOR OPIOID
PRESCRIBING
In the large majority of cases involving physicians who are arrested for
violation of the controlled substance laws but who are arguably treating
pain patients, the charges are based on distributing or dispensing controlled
substances (generally opioids) in violation of section 841(a) of the CSA321 or
similar state law provisions.322 These charges require that the government
“prove: (1) ‘that the [physician] distributed . . . a controlled substance’; (2)
that the [physician] ‘acted knowingly and intentionally’; and (3) ‘that the
[physician’s] actions were not for legitimate medical purposes in the usual
course of his professional medical practice or were beyond the bounds of
medical practice.’”323
It is the last element that has proved most difficult and problematic for
the courts, which have struggled with the concept.324 Neither the CSA nor
its implementing regulations define “legitimate medical purpose”; nor do
they set standards as to what constitutes “the usual course of professional
practice.”325 The two phrases were discussed at some length in United
States v. Moore,326 one of the first cases involving interpretation of the CSA

321. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000).
322. The state laws are typically based on the Uniform Controlled Substances Act drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. UNIFORM CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT (1994), available at www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/
ucsa94.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008). The Uniform Act has been adopted by every state but
New Hampshire and Vermont. See Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of
Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,716, 52,717 n.12 (Sept. 6, 2006).
323. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 475 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1187 (4th Cir. 1995)); see United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 68990 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1141 (4th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Daniel, 3 F.3d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04
(2007) (describing the purpose of issuing prescriptions); Dispensing Controlled Substances for
the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. at 52,717 (describing state law requirements).
324. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975); United States v.
Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1975) (Ely, J. dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult to see how
the language can be made more precise and at the same time ban the undesirable conduct
on the part of physicians which Congress intended to make illegal and subject to sanctions.”);
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1973) (“‘[w]hat constitutes bona fide
medical practice must be determined upon consideration of evidence and attending
circumstances.’”) (quoting Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (alteration in
original)). For a discussion of this struggle, see infra notes 426-435 and accompanying text.
325. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(1) (2000) (outlining congressional findings, which include that
many controlled substances have a legitimate medical purpose); see also Houck, supra note
284, at 11 (“The usual course of professional practice arguably involves such factors as the
practitioner’s medical specialty, his or her professional training and applicable practice
guidelines.”).
326. 423 U.S. 122.
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by the U.S. Supreme Court. At issue in the case was, first, whether
registrants under the CSA were exempt from prosecution under section
841(a)(1) and could only be prosecuted under sections 842 and 843, which
imposed significantly less harsh penalties;327 and, second, if physicians
could be prosecuted under Sec. 841, whether Moore’s conduct was
authorized by the Act.328 Moore, a physician, was convicted of “knowing
and unlawful distribution and dispensation of methadone . . . in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1).”329 Evidence presented at trial indicated that Moore
had “prescribed large quantities of methadone” for patients with “only the
most perfunctory [physical] examination” and minimal instructions.330 He
charged fees based on “the quantity [of methadone] prescribed, rather than
[on] the medical services performed.”331 Moore argued that he was using
an innovative protocol in an attempt to treat narcotic addiction332 and that,
by and large, his patients came off heroin as a result of his “treatment.”333
The Court was required to ascertain whether his acts constituted behavior
“outside the usual course of professional practice.”334 In making that
determination, the Court referred to Congress’ passage of the Narcotic
Addict Treatment Act of 1974 (NATA).335 The Court noted that when
Congress passed NATA, “it sought to ‘cure’” the difficulty in prosecuting
physicians under the CSA “‘because of the intricate and nearly impossible
burden of establishing what is beyond “the course of professional practice”
for criminal law purposes when such a practitioner speciously claims that the
practices in question were ethical and humanitarian in nature.’”336 NATA

327. Early cases interpreting the CSA debated whether the severe criminal sanctions of
section 841 applied to physician registrants or whether Congress intended that registrant
violations be dealt with through professional or administrative action and subject to “lesssevere criminal and civil sanctions provided in sections 842 and 843” of the Act. Rosenberg,
515 F.2d at 203. The issue was resolved in Moore, 423 U.S. at 124, which held “that
registered physicians can be prosecuted under § 841 when their activities fall outside the usual
course of professional practice.”
328. Moore, 423 U.S. at 124, 131.
329. Id. at 124.
330. Id. at 126-27.
331. Id. at 126.
332. Sentencing Transcript at 129, United States v. Moore, Crim. No. 1350-72 (1975)
(stating that the protocol “involved a saturation to a point of blockade, in which the euphoria
formerly obtained was no longer obtained from heroin and an incentive to become completely
drug-free”); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 126 (stating that Moore’s “defense at trial was that
he had devised a new method of detoxification based on the work of a British practitioner”).
333. Sentencing Transcript at 130, Moore, Crim. No. 1350-72.
334. Moore, 423 U.S. at 124, 139.
335. Id. at 139 n.16; Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-281, 88
Stat. 124.
336. Moore, 423 U.S. at 139 n.16 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-192, at 14 (1973)).
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apparently did this by setting up a separate set of explicit requirements that
a practitioner must meet in order to dispense narcotic drugs for
maintenance or detoxification treatment for addicts.337 While the new law
helped clarify what constituted “legitimate medical practice” when treating
addicts, the phrase remains undefined outside of that context.
Another contentious issue in prosecuting these cases arises in
establishing the mens rea necessary to convict under section 841. Courts
have apparently agreed that the knowledge requirement applies to the third
element of the crime, i.e., that the prosecution must prove that the physician
knowingly or intentionally prescribed outside the usual course of
professional practice or not for a legitimate medical purpose.338 Because
determining what the physician actually knew or intended is difficult, “courts
have held that a deliberate course of conduct whereby the defendant avoids
the requisite guilty knowledge may be held tantamount to guilty knowledge
per se.”339 In these cases, the trial court may issue to the jury a “conscious
avoidance” charge, also known as a “willful blindness” instruction.340 In the
context of illegal drug distribution, the instructions have been used primarily
for cases where the defendant is accused of transporting drugs and claims
not to have been aware that he was carrying the drugs, e.g., did not know
the contents of the suitcase he was asked to carry.341 But, the instructions
have also been used in cases against physicians prescribing drugs to
patients who subsequently diverted them with the prosecution arguing that

337. See OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 266, at 23; see also supra note 266
and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We
agree with Dr. Feingold’s contention that a practitioner who acts outside the usual course of
professional practice may be convicted under § 841(a) only if he does so intentionally. . . .
Simply put, to convict a practitioner under § 841(a), the government must prove . . . that the
practitioner acted with intent to distribute the drugs and with intent to distribute them outside
the course of professional practice. In other words, the jury must make a finding of intent not
merely with respect to distribution, but also with respect to the doctor’s intent to act as a
pusher rather than a medical professional.”).
339. Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, Propriety of Instruction of Jury on “Conscious
Avoidance” of Knowledge of Nature of Substance or Transaction in Prosecution for Possession
or Distribution of Drugs, 109 A.L.R. FED. 710, 713, § 2[a] (1992).
340. See id. The charge has also been referred to as “an ostrich instruction, because the
defendant is considered by the court to have, figuratively, stuck his head in the sand to avoid
learning truths that would otherwise have been patently obvious to the average reasonable
person.” Id. See also JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS
100-01 (1st ed. 2001) (discussing the willful blindness jury instruction).
341. See Sprenger, supra note 339, at 714, § 2.
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the physician deliberately ignored facts that would have led one to believe
the patient was diverting the drugs.342
Defendants have been assisted, to some extent, by the fact that virtually
all courts hearing these cases have accepted a good faith defense to the
charges.343 Thus, physicians have been able to argue that they prescribed
in good faith, i.e., with the honest belief that they were doing so to treat a
patient’s pain.344 While the good faith defense may appear helpful to

342. See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 445 F.3d 1023, 1031 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A willful
blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge, but
the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance. Ignorance is deliberate if the
defendant was presented with facts that put her on notice that criminal activity was particularly
likely and yet she intentionally failed to investigate those facts.”) (quoting United States v.
Florez, 368 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004)); Transcript of Record at 1221, United States v.
McIver, 470 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-4884) (jury instructions stating, “[t]he
government may prove the defendant acted knowingly by proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that this defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to
him. No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious”).
343. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); McIver, 470 F.3d 550;
United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2006); Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001; United
States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United
States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 68990 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1187 (4th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1141 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hughes,
895 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d
187 (6th Cir. 1975).
344. For example, the federal pattern jury instruction for the good faith defense states:
In order to sustain its burden of proof . . . the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and deliberately [distributed]
[dispensed] . . . a controlled substance and did so other than in good faith in the usual
course of a professional practice and in accordance with a standard of medical
practice generally recognized and accepted in the United States. The defendant may
not be convicted if [he] [she] merely made an honest effort to treat [his] [her] patients in
compliance with an accepted standard of medical practice.
A controlled substance is [distributed] [dispensed] . . . by a [physician] [pharmacist] in
the usual course of [his] [her] professional practice and, therefore, lawfully, if the
substance is [distributed] [dispensed] . . . by [him] [her] in good faith in medically
treating a patient. Good faith in this context means good intentions and the honest
exercise of good professional judgment as to a patient's medical needs. Good faith
connotes an observance of conduct in accordance with what the [physician]
[pharmacist] should reasonably believe to be proper medical practice.
In determining whether or not Defendant _____ acted in good faith in the course of a
medical practice, you may consider all of the evidence in the case which relates to that
conduct.
Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct charged in Count _____
of the indictment was not done in good faith in the course of a medical practice you
must acquit Defendant _____ of that charge.
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physicians, the courts have, to some extent, undercut its effectiveness by
concluding that the good faith test must be an objective, not a subjective
test.345 Such an objective test has allowed prosecutors to bring in evidence
of “red flags,” i.e., indications that a reasonable physician would have
known that his prescribing was not for a legitimate medical purpose.346
Physicians who are targeted by the DEA and their state-enforcement
counterparts find it very difficult to defend against the alleged charges. In
these cases, the physicians are often charged with hundreds of counts of
criminal wrongdoing.347 The large numbers are somewhat misleading in
that “ordinary events in a doctor’s office become criminal when the doctor
steps outside the bounds of legitimate medicine.”348 As a result, each time
a physician writes a new prescription for a controlled substance it can be a
separate crime.349 The same act can be considered healthcare fraud if the
prescribing is not medically necessary and a third party payer is billed for the
drugs.350 Moreover, if the prescription is sent through the mail, the
physician can be guilty of mail fraud.351 In addition,
[s]eeing a patient who turns out to be a drug dealer or addict can lead to a
conspiracy count, as can working with one’s colleagues. . . . [Moreover],
any death that can in any way be connected to use of the doctor’s
prescriptions becomes a charge of drug dispensing resulting in death or
serious injury—even if the person who died stole the drug from a legitimate
patient, lied to get the drug, used it with other drugs or alcohol, or expired
while suffering from a potentially fatal illness.352

In many of these cases, prosecutors use conspiracy and racketeering
charges to expand the reach of the underlying charges and bring more
evidence into the case.353 Practically, conspiracy charges allow the
KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 64.16 at 428-29 (5th ed.
2000) (alterations in original).
345. See Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 480 (“‘Every court to examine the issue has held that the
objective standard that the doctor acted in accordance with what he reasonably believed to be
proper medical practice should apply.’”) (quoting 3 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Instruction 56-19, cmt. (2003)).
346. See John Tierney, Trafficker or Healer? And Who’s the Victim?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2007, at F1 (discussing the use of “red flags” in the prosecution of Dr. William Hurwitz).
347. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 6 (stating that Dr. Jeri Hassman was “charged with
362 counts of prescribing controlled drugs outside the normal practice of medicine”).
348. Szalavitz, supra note 61, at 35.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. In general, conspiracy statutes, because of their broad reach, have been described
“as the ‘darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.’” O’SULLIVAN, supra note 340, at 564
(quoting Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) (Learned Hand, J.)).
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prosecution to admit statements by co-conspirators into evidence that would
otherwise be considered hearsay.354 In these cases, patient informants are
the co-conspirators. Their “statements, if believed, can be very damaging to
the defense because they often constitute the only direct evidence regarding
such central issues as the defendant’s knowledge or intent.”355 Under the
CSA, there is a specific provision outlawing attempt or conspiracy to commit
another offense in the Act.356 While most federal conspiracy statutes require
“(1) the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) the
defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3)
the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,”357 the CSA
does not require proof of an overt act for conviction.358 Thus, proving the
elements of conspiracy under the CSA is significantly easier than under most
other federal statutes. In addition, the “knowledge requirement” can be
satisfied “by showing either that [the defendant] actually knew of the
conspiracy . . . or that he was willfully blind to it by ‘purposely clos[ing] his
eyes to avoid knowing what was taking place around him.’”359
Federal prosecutors also routinely bring racketeering charges in these
cases under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
statute.360 Using the RICO statute often is controversial, as it is regularly
applied to conduct that is far outside the original purpose of the Act, i.e., to
eradicate organized crime.361 Prosecutors frequently attempt to invoke
RICO outside the organized crime context because of the increased

354. Id. (discussing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)).
355. Id.
356. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000).
357. United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1986).
358. See 21 U.S.C. § 846.
359. United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 563 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 1999)).
360. See, e.g., Nair, Dr. Knox Pleads Guilty, Surrenders License, supra note 84 (describing
case against Dr. Cecil Knox, who faced ninety-five charges, among them racketeering and
conspiracy to commit racketeering); see also News Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of
Va., Dr. Cecil Knox Surrenders Medical License and DEA Registration Number; Sentenced to
Five Years Probation (Jan. 20, 2006), at www.usdoj.gov/usao/vaw/press_releases/
knox_20jan2006.html (last visited July 23, 2008) (“Knox . . . admitted to owning and
operating a criminal enterprise in Roanoke called Southwest Virginia Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation, PC. The criminal enterprise and Dr. Knox made money by billing Medicare,
Medicaid, and insurance companies for medical services purportedly performed by Dr. Knox.
Beginning in 1997 and continuing through 2002, Dr. Knox unlawfully participated in the
conduct of the affairs of that criminal enterprise and conducted a pattern of racketeering
activities in an effort to gain monetary profit.”).
361. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661, 750 (1987) (“[B]y far the greater number of RICO indictments in the white collar
area have no connection whatever to organized crime.”).
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sanctions and remedies it allows.362 For example, it provides not only
traditional criminal penalties, but also criminal forfeiture, i.e., forfeiture of all
assets acquired in connection with the criminal enterprise.363
In addition to conspiracy and racketeering charges and charges based
on violation of the CSA or its state counterparts, physicians prescribing
opioids are often charged with healthcare fraud. These charges are
typically based on allegations that the drugs prescribed by the physician
were not “medically necessary” and, thus, were prescribed in violation of
federal Medicare and federal/state Medicaid laws.364 The government may
also bring a number of federal and state false claims actions.365 Although
prosecutions based on alleged false claims in this area have rarely been
successful, the charges are often brought forward in the initial stages of
prosecution in an effort to force settlement or bolster the government’s
claims of unlawful prescribing.366
VII. DEA ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
The recent arrests and prosecutions of physicians described in this paper
have coincided with a series of “campaigns” initiated by the DEA to pursue
physicians prescribing opioids. In 2001, the DEA announced a new antiDEA
drug campaign that it called the OxyContin Action Plan.367
Administrator Asa Hutchinson testified that the initiative was necessary to
combat what has been called “a deadly drug epidemic spreading
throughout rural America” and that the DEA would reallocate its resources
to address this threat.368 The DEA targeted doctors, pharmacists, and
dentists in this crackdown on illegal prescription diversion.369
362. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000) (describing the criminal penalties for violating the
statute to include fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture of assets acquired in connection with the
criminal enterprise).
363. See id.
364. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (2000).
365. See Hoffmann, supra note 289, at 359 (noting that in a number of cases the
government has charged physicians with fraud and abuse law violations for allegedly
prescribing medications that were not “medically necessary”).
366. See id. at 358-59 (“To be successful in a false claims action, the government must
prove that the defendant submitted a claim to the government for payment, that the defendant
had knowledge that the claim was false or fraudulent, and that the claim was in fact false or
fraudulent.”).
367. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 10; Libby, supra note 301. The initiative
was partly in response to a G.A.O. report that was highly critical of the DEA’s failure to
combat prescription drug abuse. See id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, REP. NO.
GAO/GGD-99-108, DRUG CONTROL: DEA’S STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE 1990S
(1999)).
368. Libby, supra note 301. In a news briefing, Libby contended that the DEA referral to an
OxyContin “epidemic” is unfounded. He stated that the DEA had based this statement on
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In 2003, the DEA requested $24.6 million and 133 new positions to
strengthen and improve its diversion control efforts.370 In addition, the
Agency developed a “National Action Plan” that targets “key sources of
OxyContin and other opioids, including medical professionals it considers
unscrupulous.”371 In March 2004, the Bush Administration announced “a
coordinated drug strategy to confront the illegal diversion and abuse of
prescription drugs.”372
While the DEA was ramping up its enforcement efforts, it came under
intense criticism by physician groups for the chilling effects of its high profile
arrests and prosecutions of physicians.373 As a result, in August 2004 after
extensive consultation with the Federation of State Medical Boards and other
groups, the DEA published on its Web site a set of guidelines “providing
‘some clarifications about what does or does not constitute questionable
[prescribing] activity in the eyes of the DEA.’”374 The guidelines, in the form
of “Prescription Pain Medications: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers
for Health Care Professionals and Law Enforcement Personnel” (FAQs)
provided physicians with advice on how to identify a person who is likely to

figures of OxyContin-related deaths, many of which were not caused by OxyContin or
OxyContin alone, but by a combination of OxyContin and other drugs. Id.; see also Hearing
Before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics, 107th Cong. (2002), available at
www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct041102p.html (last visited July 23, 2008) (statement of
Asa Hutchinson, Adm’r, Drug Enforcement Admin.).
369. See Libby, supra note 301.
370. Ammann, supra note 198, at 33.
371. Id. At about the same time, federal agencies began to investigate Purdue Pharma,
the manufacturer of OxyContin. See Barry Meier, 3 Officials Are Sentenced In Case Involving
OxyContin, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at C4. The investigation ultimately ended in May
2007 with a plea agreement between Purdue Frederick, a holding company affiliated with
Purdue Pharma, and three of Purdue Pharma’s top executives and the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
Id. The company “pleaded guilty to a felony charge that it had fraudulently claimed to doctors
and patients that OxyContin would cause less abuse and addiction than competing shortacting narcotics” and agreed to pay $600 million in fines. Id. The executives “pleaded guilty
to misdemeanor charges of misbranding,” paid $34.5 million in fines, and were later
sentenced to “three years of probation and . . . 400 hours of service in a drug abuse or drug
treatment program.” Id.
372. Press Release, Office of Nat’l Drug Control Pol’y, U.S. Drug Prevention, Treatment,
Enforcement Agencies Take on “Doctor Shoppers,” “Pill Mills” (Mar. 1, 2004), at
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press04/030104.html (last visited July 23, 2008).
373. See Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 316, at 22.
374. American Cancer Society, New Guidance Issued for Opioid Pain Medication, 54 CA
CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 288, 288 (2004) (quoting Patricia Good of the DEA’s Office of
Diversion Control); see Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69
Fed. Reg. 67,170, 67,170 (Nov. 16, 2004).
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abuse or divert drugs for criminal distribution.375 While pain treatment
advocates applauded the DEA for its efforts to clarify the bases for its arrests
of physicians for opioid prescribing, in October 2004 the DEA withdrew the
FAQs, stating that they included some “misstatements.”376
On November 16, 2004, DEA published an Interim Policy Statement
(IPS) which, it said, corrected some of the misstatements of the earlier
document.377 The pain treatment community and others reacted to the
withdrawal of the FAQs and subsequent IPS with surprise and criticism. In
response to the DEA actions, thirty attorneys general wrote a letter to DEA
Administrator Karen Tandy arguing that “the agency was not properly
balancing the need for stopping drug diversion with the need to treat
legitimate pain.”378 And, David Joranson, Director of the Pain & Policy
Studies Group at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School,
wrote a letter to the Deputy Administrator of the DEA’s Office of Diversion
Control, asserting that “the IPS misrepresented the FAQ[s] and made
suggestions that are likely to interfere in medical practice and pain
management, while contributing little if anything to addressing prescription
drug abuse and illegal activities that result in diversion.”379 Furthermore,
Joranson stated that in the IPS, “[s]ome interpretations of law governing
prescribing and dispensing contradict DEA’s own earlier official statements
and have already started to cause confusion and concern among pain
practitioners.”380 In particular, Joranson complained that the IPS did not
acknowledge “that it is within the scope of federal law to prescribe opioids
for the purpose of treating pain in patients with addictive disease or a history
of substance abuse” while the FAQ did.381
In response to these complaints, on January 18, 2005, the DEA issued a
statement in the Federal Register that it was soliciting comments from
375. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69 Fed. Reg. at
67,170.
376. See id. While this reason was the official statement regarding the retraction of the
FAQs, there is some evidence that they were withdrawn because the defense in the Hurwitz
trial attempted to use them as evidence in his favor. See Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 68.
377. Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,170
(Nov. 16, 2004); Solicitation of Comments on Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the
Treatment of Pain, 70 Fed. Reg. 2883 (Jan. 18, 2005).
378. Ralph Vartabedian, At Least 20 Years Await Convicted Doctor, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2005, at A14 (citing Letter from Thirty State Attorneys General, supra note 14).
379. Letter from David Joranson, Dir., Univ. of Wis. Pain & Policy Studies Group, to
Michelle Leonhart, Deputy Adm’r, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Admin.
(Nov. 24, 2004), available at www.painpolicy.wisc.edu/DEA/IPSresponse.pdf (last visited July
23, 2008).
380. Id.
381. Id. Joranson made the further point that “[s]ome individuals with addictive disease
also have severe pain due to cancer and other diseases.” Id.

HOFFMANN FOR CHRISTENSEN2.DOC

2008]

MARCH 10, 2009 11:22 AM

TREATING PAIN V. REDUCING DRUG DIVERSION AND ABUSE

283

physicians and other interested persons “as to what areas of the law relating
to the dispensing of controlled substances for the treatment of pain they
would like DEA to address” in a future Federal Register document.382
Subsequently, in September 2006, DEA issued a comprehensive policy
statement, responding to the comments it received and setting out “the
pertinent principles” under the law “relating to the dispensing of controlled
substances for the treatment of pain.”383 A significant focus of the statement
was the extent to which prescription drugs are being abused in this
country.384 The statement cited several recent studies documenting an
increase in the abuse of prescription drugs, generally, and opioids for pain
treatment, more specifically, over the past decade.385
With this backdrop, the statement went on to describe the basis on
which DEA acts to address illegal prescribing of pain medications. The
starting point for its discussion was the provision of law stating that any
prescription of a controlled substance “must be issued for a legitimate
medical purpose by a registered physician acting within the usual course of
professional practice.”386 The statement summarizes the history of the
standard, going back to its roots in the Harrison Narcotics Act, and asserts
that the “requirement has been construed to mean that the prescription must
be ‘in accordance with a standard of medical practice generally recognized
and accepted in the United States’”387 but that “[f]ederal courts have long
recognized that it is not possible to expand on the phrase ‘legitimate
medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice,’ in a way that
will provide definitive guidelines that address all the varied situations
physicians might encounter.”388 The courts, the document states, generally
have not had to define the circumstances more clearly because the facts

382. Solicitation of Comments on Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment
of Pain, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2883.
383. Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,716,
52,716 (Sept. 6, 2006).
384. See id.
385. See id. at 52,716 nn.1, 3-4 (citing NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH, RESEARCH REPORT SERIES: PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: ABUSE AND ADDICTION (2005), available
at www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/RRPrescription.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008); OFFICE OF NAT’L
DRUG CONTROL POLICY, 2006 SYNTHETIC DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: A FOCUS ON
METHAMPHETAMINE AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE (2006), available at www.whitehousedrug
policy.gov/publications/synthetic_drg_control_strat/synth_strat.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008);
OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., THE NSDUH
REPORT: NONMEDICAL USERS OF PAIN RELIEVERS: CHARACTERISTICS OF RECENT INITIATES (2006),
available at www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k6/pain/pain.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008)).
386. Id. at 52,716.
387. Id. at 52,717 (quoting United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 139 (1975)).
388. Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. at 52,717.
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were “not merely of questionable legality, but instead . . . a glaring example
of illegal activity.”389
In response to commenter requests for DEA to provide guidance to
physicians as to practices that could get them into trouble, DEA echoed the
sentiments of the courts, stating that “when it comes to prescribing
controlled substances for pain” treatment, “one cannot provide an
exhaustive and foolproof list of ‘do and don’ts.’”390 The Agency further
stated that while it does not have the authority to educate physicians as to
how to make “sound medical decisions in treating pain,” it “does have the
authority and the expertise to investigate and determine whether a
prescription for a controlled substance was issued for a legitimate medical
purpose in the usual course of professional practice within the meaning of
the CSA and DEA regulations.”391
VIII. ARGUMENTS FOR A CHANGE IN THE LAW AND PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICES
In this section, I first present arguments as to why the current standard
under the CSA is untenable and should be changed. Second, I argue that,
as a policy matter, DEA’s aggressive efforts to prosecute physicians
prescribing opioids for chronic pain patients are doing more harm than
good.
A.

An Inappropriate Standard

In passing the CSA, Congress was seeking to control illegal distribution
of controlled substances without interfering with legitimate medical
practices.392 Individuals concerned with drug control policy and pain
treatment have recognized the importance of these two goals and the need
for balance393 in government policies and law enforcement actions so that
efforts to prevent abuse and diversion of controlled substances do “not
interfere with their essential uses for the relief of pain.”394
At issue in many of the cases brought against physicians prescribing
opioids is what constitutes “legitimate medical practice,” which is not
defined in the law or regulations.395 While this definitional issue is often at
the heart of the relevant court cases, the more significant question may be

389. Id.
390. Id. at 52,719.
391. Id. at 52,719 n.21.
392. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Criminalizing the Prescribing of Opioids: Where Should We
Draw the Line?, BIOETHICS F., Apr. 12, 2007, at www.bioethicsforum.org/treating-painWilliam-Hurwitz-Controlled-Substances-Act.asp (last visited July 23, 2008).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See supra notes 321-337 and accompanying text.
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whether the current standard for violation of the law, i.e., failure to prescribe
within “the usual course of . . . professional practice” and “for a legitimate
medical purpose,” is appropriate.396 Arguably, the standard draws the line
too far on the side of prosecutions and does not adequately take into
account the range of patients seen by physicians treating pain.
On one end of the spectrum are patients who are truly in pain and may
need and use significant volumes of pain medication. They do not abuse or
divert their medications. . . . On the other end are drug dealers who don’t
even pretend to be patients. They may strike a deal with the doctor—drugs
for sex or money. . . . Bu[t], also along the continuum are individuals who
come to the physician under false pretenses—individuals who pretend to be
in pain but actually have no pain and plan to sell the drugs on the street.397

Some of these patients may be good actors and it may not be possible
for the well-meaning doctor to ferret out the good from the bad. At this
point in time, “[t]here is no objective test for pain.”398 Neither is there an
easy test to determine whether the patient is telling the truth. The
determination of whether or not a patient is lying is a judgment call a
physician must make by observing the patient’s behavior.399
In response to prosecutor claims that doctors should know when
individuals are feigning pain solely to obtain prescriptions for opioids, Drs.
Jung and Reidenberg did a study to determine how readily physicians can
tell when patients lie.400 They found that physicians correctly identified
patients who were lying (pretending to be patients when they were not) only
10% of the time.401 The authors attributed this result to an observation that
doctors operate with a “truth bias,” i.e., they “assume that patients come to
see them because they have a problem for which they want treatment.”402
Given this bias, second guessing a physician’s judgment in these matters,
after the fact, seems patently unfair.403

396. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2007) (stating that an effective prescription for a
controlled substance “must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual
practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice”).
397. See Hoffmann, supra note 392.
398. Id.
399. See id.
400. Beth Jung & Marcus M. Reidenberg, Physicians Being Deceived, 8 PAIN MED. 433
(2007).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 414. In contrast, the authors point out, that law enforcement personnel start
with a different assumption – that people are not being truthful. Despite this, they reported on
a study of police, judges, and federal law enforcement agents which found that “only Secret
Service agents were better than chance at detecting lying.” Id. (citing P. Ekman & M.
O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913 (1991)).
403. See Hoffmann, supra note 392.
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Additionally, physicians may see patients who are diverting or abusing
narcotics but who are also legitimately in pain. Arguably, prosecuting a
physician who prescribes opioids to such patients is unfair if he or she is
attempting to relieve the patient’s pain, even if the physician knows, based
on past behavior, that the patient may abuse or divert the drugs.404 Despite
the possibility for abuse or diversion, “in the absence of some kickback or
tangible benefit . . . , or incontrovertible evidence that the doctor has simply
exercised no medical judgment at all, it is difficult to justify criminal
prosecution of a doctor for his prescribing or dispensing”405 of opioids for
patients complaining of chronic pain.
While many pain treatment advocates viewed the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in the Hurwitz case as a victory, because it allowed a jury to
consider whether the physician was acting in good faith when he prescribed
the drugs at issue, I have argued elsewhere that it is
not at all clear that it has rectified the imbalance of the current law, which
seems uncomfortably close to a civil negligence standard. An objective
good faith test to determine whether a physician is prescribing within the
‘usual course of professional practice’ and for a ‘legitimate medical
purpose’ appears virtually identical to [a medical malpractice standard
wherein the inquiry is] whether the physician was prescribing consistent with
the current standard of care.406

Not only are the standards difficult to differentiate, but the evidence
necessary to establish violation of each standard is practically the same. In
applying the malpractice standard, courts typically consider whether the
physician performed a thorough exam, took the patient’s medical history,
asked about other drug use, and prescribed the appropriate drug or
dosage.407 In prosecuting physicians under the CSA, law enforcers seem to
be focusing on similar standard of care issues, particularly the volume and
dosage of narcotics that physicians are prescribing.408

404. Id.
405. Id. Such a benefit might include “cash, sexual favors, [or] continuing to receive
payment for maintaining an unnecessary doctor-patient relationship.” Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Stephen E. Stone, former Associate Chief Counsel of DEA, describes some of the
elements that make up prescribing in the course of one’s “professional practice”:
In order for a practitioner to prescribe or dispense in the course of his professional
practice, there must exist between the doctor and the “patient” a valid physicianpatient relationship. To establish this relationship, the patient must come to the
physician seeking treatment for some kind of physical or psychological condition or
symptomology. The physician must then obtain from the patient enough of a medical
history, either through interview or by written form, to assist him in making a diagnosis
of the complaint and the patient’s general physical condition. Moreover, the physician
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Clearly, focusing on volume and dosage is not an appropriate basis for
arrest when expert medical opinion is that no consistent upper limit to
prescribing for pain across all patients exists. Rather, it is the quantity of
medication that eliminates the patient’s pain without serious adverse side
effects that is appropriate.409 That dosage is unique for each patient.
Nevertheless, it appears from both news accounts and DEA literature that
many doctors have been investigated because of the large volumes of
opioids they prescribe and because they are seeing patients from outside of
the state where they practice.410 In part, these prescribing practices result
from non-pain experts referring to these doctors out of fear of regulatory
scrutiny.411 Therefore, a small number of doctors are becoming saddled
with treating a large number of patients in pain.
Because arguments have been made on appeal in a number of these
cases that the jury instructions were inappropriate for failing to sufficiently
distinguish between a civil and criminal standard, several appellate courts
have addressed the issue.412 The most recent is the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. McIver.413 McIver “argue[d] that by referring to ‘norms of
professional practice’ in the jury instructions, the district court improperly
allowed the jury to convict on a civil, rather than a criminal, standard of
proof.”414 The Fourth Circuit admitted that the potential for juries to confuse
the civil and criminal standard in these cases “requires courts to exercise
care in setting out the governing standard.”415 Despite this admission, the
court clung to the notion that courts and jurors can adequately differentiate
the two norms of behavior.416 Yet, in the end, it approved a jury instruction
that arguably went beyond what is required by the current statutory
standard. In McIver, the district judge instructed the jury that the
government had to prove that the physician “used ‘his authority to prescribe
controlled substances . . . not for treatment of a patient, but for the purpose
must conduct an examination or other medically recognized procedure sufficient to
make a diagnosis. Finally, there must be a logical connection, or nexus, between the
drug ultimately prescribed and the physical or psychological condition diagnosed.
Stone, supra note 222, at 24.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 291-94.
410. See supra Part II.
411. See infra Part VIII.C.
412. See, e.g., United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.
2006); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alerre,
430 F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132 (4th Cir.
1994); United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986).
413. 470 F.3d at 557.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 558.
416. See id. at 559.
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of assisting another in the maintenance of a drug habit’ or some other
illegitimate purposes, such as his own ‘personal profit.’”417 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that “[t]his instruction set the proper threshold for
conviction by placing unlawful conduct beyond the bounds of any legitimate
medical practice, including that which would constitute civil negligence.”418
While these instructions do appear to set a higher bar than those
required by the prevailing law or those that have been given in other
prosecutions of physicians for illegally prescribing controlled substances,419
they only represent a part of the overall instructions. Jurors were also told
that they should “consider the extent to which ‘any violation of professional
norms . . . committed by the defendant interfered with his treatment of his
patients and contributed to an over prescription and/or excessive
dispensation of controlled substances.’”420 Although the court subsequently
stated “that ‘a violation of a professional norm does not in and of itself
establish a violation of [a] criminal law,’”421 subsequent interviews with
jurors in the case indicate that jurors were confused about the relevant
standard.422
Apparently, juries are, in fact, often confused in these cases.423
Although courts that allow expert testimony to establish the standard of care

417. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 1292).
418. McIver, 470 F.3d at 559.
419. The court, in fact, distinguishes the instructions in McIver from those given in two prior
cases where the defendant also alleged that the court had applied a civil negligence standard
rather than a criminal standard. Id. at 558-60. In United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18
F.3d 1132 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that during the trial, the district
court had confused the two standards, but nevertheless determined that the jury instructions
were appropriate when the jury was instructed “to consider all of the defendant’s actions, and
provide[] specific examples of behavior that tended to denote illegitimacy, such as prescribing
drugs without performing physical examinations, or asking patients about the amount or type
of drugs they want.” McIver, 470 F.3d at 558. The McIver court also referred to the jury
instructions in United States v. Alerre (4th Cir. 2005), 430 F.3d 681. See McIver, 470 F.3d at
558.
420. McIver, 470 F.3d at 559 (quoting jury instructions in Joint Appendix at 1293).
421. See id. at 560 (alteration in original) (quoting jury instructions in Joint Appendix at
1293).
422. See Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 55.
423. Jurors in the Hurwitz case, for example, were influenced by the evidence that Hurwitz
did not pick up on certain “red flags” indicating that his patients had used controlled
substances for recreational purposes and were likely to do so again (e.g., they had been
arrested for drug trafficking, had several positive tests for cocaine, or had called in to his
office for early refills of their medication in a short period of time). See Tierney Lab: Putting
Ideas in Science to the Test, at http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/30/hurwitzjurors-explain-their-verdict/ (Apr. 30, 2007, 5:38 EST); Tierney Lab: Putting Ideas in Science
to the Test, at http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/the-hurwitz-jurors-explainfurther/ (May 2, 2007, 20:14 EST).
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state that “mere” malpractice/civil negligence is not enough for a criminal
conviction and instruct that a physician’s failure to meet the relevant
standard must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, such instructions
are insufficient to cure any confusion of civil and criminal standards on the
part of lay juries.
The confusion created by the current standard may also encourage
physicians to under treat pain or to stop treating chronic pain patients
altogether. Fear of potential criminal liability, however, is only one side of
the legal pressures they face. Physicians who undertreat pain or who ignore
patient complaints of pain also face potential civil malpractice liability and
disciplinary action.424 In addition, if a physician suspects that a patient is
abusing or diverting drugs, in order to protect him or herself from criminal
liability, the physician may decide to terminate the patient-physician
relationship. While physicians may stop prescribing a drug whenever the
risks, including potential abuse, outweigh the benefits, they may face a
lawsuit or disciplinary action for patient abandonment if they stop treating a
patient without adequate notice and an opportunity for the patient to find
another healthcare provider.425 Abruptly stopping treatment of a patient on
opioids also creates healthcare risks, including painful withdrawal
symptoms, unless the patient is gradually weaned off the medication.
In sum, the current legal framework makes physicians risk criminal
liability for prescribing opioids when they know or should have known that a
patient is abusing or diverting his or her drugs (even if the patients are also
in pain) and risk civil liability or professional disciplinary action if they ignore
their patient’s requests for pain relief or abandon their patient because they
believe the patient has diverted their drugs. Given the difficulty in
determining when a patient is abusing or diverting and the simultaneous
legal risks for undertreating and abandonment, the current criminal
standard is inappropriate and should be changed.

424. See Matthew Yi, Doctor Found Reckless for Not Relieving Pain: $1.5 Million Jury
Verdict for Family of Cancer Patient Who Went Home to Hayward to Die, S.F. CHRON., June
14, 2001, at A1 (describing case against Dr. Wing Chin); see also supra note 288 and
accompanying text.
425. The Vermont Board of Medical Practice, for example, considers abandonment
unprofessional conduct and considers the following factors in determining whether termination
was appropriate: (1) physician provided timely written notice (at least 30 days, presented to
patient in a manner to ensure receipt); (2) physician provided care in transition period (at least
30 days); (3) physician transferred records to new physician. VT. BD. OF MED. PRACTICE,
ADVISORY: TERMINATION OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (1999), available at
http://healthvermont.gov/hc/med_board/documents/010699terminationadvisory.pdf
(last
visited July 23, 2008).
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Constitutional Violations

At least two constitutional arguments can be made to challenge the
arrest and prosecution of physicians treating pain patients. First, the
standard that is being applied is unconstitutionally vague. Second, using
the standard to confine or take away a physician’s ability to practice may
substantially interfere with chronic pain patients’ constitutional right to pain
treatment.
1. Void for Vagueness
Shortly after Congress passed the CSA, two court cases addressed the
issue of whether the CSA’s provisions making “it illegal for a physician to
dispense directly to the ultimate user a schedule II controlled substance
other than ‘in the course of his professional practice’” was unconstitutionally
vague.426 In United States v. Collier, Dr. Collier argued that the words “in
the course of his professional practice” fail to adequately “warn the
physician of what conduct is proscribed, and that the statute is without
objective standards and is subject to diverse interpretation.”427 The court
acknowledged that “[i]n making a medical judgment concerning the right
treatment for an individual patient, physicians require a certain latitude of
available options.”428 Thus, “‘[w]hat constitutes bona fide medical practice
must be determined upon consideration of evidence and attending
circumstances.’”429 However, the court concluded that such circumstantial
evidence can be sufficiently clear so as not to be unconstitutionally vague
and referred to two “recent” decisions of the Supreme Court regarding state
statutes that make physician performance of abortion criminal if not
“‘necessary’” or not “‘necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or
health.’”430 According to the Collier court, the Supreme Court decided that
both statutes were constitutionally valid despite neither defining these
terms.431
In United States v. Rosenberg, the court rejected the defendant
physician’s contention that the phrase “in the course of professional
practice” appearing in 21 U.S.C. § 802(20)432 is so vague that it violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and pointed out that the

426. United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1973); see United States v.
Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1975).
427. Collier, 478 F.2d at 271.
428. Id. at 272 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
429. Id. (quoting Linder, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)) (alteration in original).
430. Id. at 272 (quoting Doe, 410 U.S. at 192; United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71
(1971)).
431. Id.
432. Section 802(20) referred to in Rosenberg is section 802(21) in the current U.S.C.
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language in question “has been in the statute books since 1914 and no one
has ever had problems with its interpretation.”433 The court stated that it
was convinced by the ease and consistency with which the language had
been interpreted by the courts that it was not vague and that it was “difficult
to see how the language [could] be made more precise and at the same
time ban the undesirable conduct on the part of physicians which Congress
[had] intended to make illegal and subject to sanctions.”434 Judge Ely, in his
dissenting opinion, however, was strident in his disagreement with the
majority, arguing that “Congress has, without doubt, used language that is
‘. . . so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess [as
to] its meaning and differ as to its application.’ . . . The Constitution plainly
condemns such vagueness, especially in criminal statutes.”435
While the majority’s view might have been true in the context of
physicians like Rosenberg, who prescribed controlled substances to
individuals who never indicated a need for the medications, it is much more
complex when the physician is prescribing to treat pain. Moreover, the
standard is arguably vaguer today than it was thirty years ago. Today, while
there is increased awareness of the need to treat non-cancer chronic pain,
differences of opinion remain in the medical community over whether
certain patterns of prescribing for pain treatment are appropriate. The
standard of care in the treatment of non-malignant chronic pain patients is
an area of medical practice in which the boundaries and contours are in flux
and one in which the boundaries may differ significantly from patient to
patient. While some patients may not tolerate even small doses due to
certain side effects, others are able to tolerate extremely high doses with little
or no ill effects. As a result, the statutory language as it applies to
physicians treating chronic pain patients is, arguably, unconstitutionally
vague and there is a need for an alternative standard that provides
physicians with greater clarity.
2. Liberty Interest in Pain Treatment
A second legal argument against the current standard is that its
application and enforcement violates patients’ constitutional right to
adequate pain treatment. In the aftermath of Washington v. Glucksberg436
and Vacco v. Quill,437 a constitutional right to adequate pain treatment
arguably exists. If so, prosecuting doctors for over-prescribing may put an

433. United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 197 (9th Cir. 1975).
434. Id. at 198.
435. Id. at 204 (Ely, J., dissenting) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926)) (first and third alterations in original).
436. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
437. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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undue burden on the exercise of that constitutional right. In a 1997 New
England Journal of Medicine article, Professor Robert Burt argued that a
majority of the Supreme Court believes “that states must not impose barriers
on the availability of palliative care for terminally ill patients.”438 Moreover,
he argued that the rulings in Glucksberg and Quill “would have the same
status as the right to an abortion established by Roe v. Wade—that is, an
individual right that cannot be overridden by state actions prohibiting or
‘unreasonably burdening’ access to a physician’s assistance.”439 Professor
Burt asserts that, as a result, current state laws that restrict the availability of
opioids for pain management, such as “[r]estrictive prescription laws, the
imposition of rigid limitations on dosages, and administrative burdens such
as the requirement of triplicate forms,” may be challenged by pain treatment
advocates.440
Neither the Supreme Court Justices nor Burt discuss the treatment of
chronic pain patients. Rather, their remarks are limited to palliative care for
the terminally ill. Yet, the right to pain relief for those suffering from severe
chronic pain would seem to be implicit in the right to pain relief for dying
patients based on the Court’s rationale for the latter. Beth Packman
Weinman relies on the concurring opinions of Justices Breyer and Stevens to
make this argument.441 Using Justice Breyer’s remarks about a liberty
interest in pain relief as a starting point, Packman asserts that “[j]ust as
severe pain at the end of life presents an indignity that violates the protected
liberty interest, one can make a strong argument that a life with continuous,
chronic severe pain is also a life without dignity, and consequently, without
liberty.”442 She couples Justice Stevens’s remarks with Breyer’s and states
that “[l]ike Justice Breyer, Justice Stevens explicitly argues that accessing
treatment to alleviate unwanted pain and suffering at the end of life is at the
heart of the liberty interest.”443 Moreover, she states that “[i]t would be hard
to imagine that this argument does not include within it a liberty interest in
freedom from unwanted pain and suffering for those who are not terminally
ill.”444

438. Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional
Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1235 (1997).
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. See Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right
to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEG. MED. 495, 527-29 (2003).
442. Id. at 528.
443. Id. at 529.
444. Id.; see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (stating that being
free to take available medications to alleviate pain is “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” such “that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed” and “so rooted
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While prosecution of doctors under section 841 of the CSA does not
directly restrict patient access to controlled substances, such prosecution
does burden the exercise of the constitutional right by deterring doctors from
prescribing, even when a patient’s need is legitimate.445 Jurisprudence
analyzing the “undue burden” of state abortion laws appears to support a
conclusion that laws criminalizing physician prescribing or opioid analgesics
place an undue burden on a patient’s right to palliative care.446 While the
“undue burden” on pain patients resulting from the prosecution of
physicians is more attenuated than that posed by the obstacles put in the
way of abortion seekers by state statutes (i.e., waiting periods, requirements
of a second opinion, parental consent), the burden may be more significant
in the pain treatment context. Improper prosecutions not only place
significant obstacles on prosecuted physician’s patients, they also have a
“chilling effect” on other physicians treating chronic pain patients, i.e., they
subsequently may refuse to treat pain patients.447 In some ways, the
situation is analogous to the abortion context where fewer and fewer
physicians are willing to provide abortions, not because of the threat of
criminal prosecution, but because of the increasing legal limits on
performing abortions.448 In both contexts, patients often have to travel

in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
445. Studies have established that there is a “chilling effect” on physician prescribing of
opioids resulting from legal sanctions for such prescribing. See Charles Schmidt, Experts
Worry About Chilling Effect of Federal Regulations on Treating Pain, 97 J. NAT’L CANCER INST.
554 (2005). Contra News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., The Myth of the “Chilling
Effect” (Oct. 30, 2003), at www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr103003p.html (last visited July 23,
2008).
446. Burt suggests that physicians threatened with disciplinary action by state medical
boards for prescribing large volumes of pain medications may be able to protect themselves
by arguing that their patients have a “constitutional right to adequate palliative care.” Burt,
supra note 438, at 1236.
447. See Schmidt, supra note 445. Contra News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin.,
supra note 445; see also note 14, supra.
448. See GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2008), at
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html (last visited July 23, 2008) (citing Rachel
K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 11 tbl.3 (2008) (noting that the number of U.S.
abortion providers declined by 2% between 2000 and 2005 (from 1,819 to 1,787)); see also
Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States
in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 10, 13-14 (2003) (documenting the
continuing decline in U.S. abortion providers, from a high of 2,908 in 1982, to 1,819 in
2000, and attributing the trend to “increasing legal constraints on the circumstances under
which abortions may be performed” and the increased risk of violence from anti-abortionists).
See infra notes 460-466, 474 and accompanying text for information as to how the arrest and
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significant distances to find a physician who will treat them or provide the
desired service.
A potential counter argument is that the state or federal government has
a legitimate interest in preventing the abuse and diversion of addictive
narcotics that trumps the individual’s right to adequate pain treatment. Burt
considers that states could attempt to defend laws restricting access to pain
medications for end of life care as justified in order to prevent abuse and
diversion for illegal purposes but argues that such a state interest would only
trump an interest in providing adequate pain relief if the courts found it
appropriate “to give higher priority to the ‘war on drugs’ than to providing
adequate palliative care for dying patients.”449 While preventing drug
addiction and abuse is a legitimate interest, it should not overcome the
individual’s right to pain relief in the context of either end of life care or
chronic pain treatment.450
C. Current Law and Enforcement Practices: An Egregious Imbalance
The competing policy goals of eliminating drug diversion and abuse and
appropriately treating pain are brought into stark relief by the government’s
policies and practices regarding drug enforcement. With most regulations,
the government may either overreach with its regulatory net, capturing too
many innocent individuals (false positives), or underreach, failing to capture
guilty individuals (false negatives). Scientists refer to these errors inherent in
virtually all regulatory schemes respectively as Type I and Type II errors.451
The question is whether we should be depriving patients in pain of needed
opioids (a result of Type I errors) in order to prevent their use for nonmedical purposes (a result of Type II errors). While the DEA has recognized
prosecution of pain physicians has affected the number of physicians willing to treat patients
with chronic pain and the impact it has had on pain patients.
449. Burt, supra note 438, at 1235-36.
450. See id. at 1236 (concluding that “[t]he generalized goal of narcotics control could not
. . . take precedence over an individual’s constitutional right to adequate palliative care”); see
also Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, The Supreme Court Addresses Physician-Assisted Suicide: Can
Its Rulings Improve Palliative Care?, 8 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 200, 201 (1999) (arguing that the
majority opinion in both Glucksburg and Quill “concludes that the double-effect doctrine
provides a rational and constitutional basis for states to allow narcotics given in high dosages
for pain relief in terminally ill patients, while prohibiting assisted suicide” and that “[t]he
concurring justices go further, suggesting that the state is obligated to permit physicians to
provide adequate pain relief at the end of life, even if such care leads to unconsciousness or
hastens death”). Alpers and Lo further assert that “[t]hese concurring opinions . . . may
establish a right to pain relief that is closely allied with other personal rights such as the right
to an abortion or the right to refuse medical treatment.” Id.
451. See American College of Physicians, Primer on Type I and Type II Errors, 4 EFFECTIVE
CLINICAL PRAC. 284, 284-85 (2001), available at www.acponline.org/clinical_information/
journals_publications/ecp/novdec01/primer_errors.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008).
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the importance of pain treatment through official statements,452 its practices
do not give adequate weight to this policy goal.453 Arguably, state and
federal drug enforcement agents are grossly overreaching with regard to
drug policy enforcement, resulting in too many false positives. If regulators
and prosecutors must err in their enforcement and prosecution with respect
to this issue, it would be more appropriate as a policy matter to underreach
than overreach. Such a result, reducing Type I errors, and concomitantly
increasing Type II errors, is defensible on both utilitarian and deontological
grounds.
1. Utilitarian Analysis
a. The Costs of Overreaching
A utilitarian analysis of this issue requires an articulation and
quantification of the costs and benefits of overreaching as compared to
underreaching.
In this context, overreaching means arresting and
prosecuting physicians who are legitimately treating pain patients. The costs
of such erroneous actions are sweeping. Not only does the innocent
physician bear the costs of the harm, including loss of livelihood that may
impact the individual and his/her family or dependents, the humiliation,
embarrassment, and physical stress of public arrest and prosecution, and
the cost of a legal defense, but others also suffer from the prosecution’s
ripple effect. This ripple effect includes harms to the physician’s current pain
patients who may not be able to find another physician who will treat their
pain, as well as to other current and future chronic pain patients who may
not be able to find a pain treatment practitioner because of the chilling
effect such criminal actions have on physicians’ general willingness to treat
chronic pain. The DEA’s view is that these high-profile cases “‘have been a
learning lesson to other physicians’”—that other physicians are much more
cautious now of how they prescribe narcotics.454 Unfortunately, it appears
that many are so cautious they will no longer prescribe narcotics as pain
treatment or treat pain patients at all. They fear that prescribing “opium452. In 1999, drug enforcement officials from the DEA and twenty-one health
organizations issued a joint statement to announce that they had begun to work “together to
prevent abuse of prescription pain medications while ensuring that they remain available for
patients in need.” A JOINT STATEMENT FROM 21 HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS & THE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., PROMOTING PAIN RELIEF AND PREVENTING ABUSE OF PAIN MEDICATIONS: A
CRITICAL BALANCING ACT (2001), available at www.aslme.org/news/press_conference/
consensus.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008).
453. See Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg.
52,716 (Sept. 6, 2006).
454. See Kaufman, supra note 6 (quoting statement of Elizabeth Willis, Chief of Drug
Operations, Office of Diversion Control, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin.).
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based drugs for pain is becoming criminalized by aggressive drug agents
and zealous prosecutors.”455
A number of pain treatment advocates have decried this chilling effect,
arguing that
[o]ne of the saddest and least noticed consequences of the war on drugs is
the under-treatment and non-treatment of chronic pain. Literally hundreds
of thousands of patients endure needless agony—in some cases turning to
suicide for relief because they could not find a doctor willing to prescribe
adequate doses of narcotics for them.456

At the time of Dr. Hurwitz’s medical board hearing, Russell Portenoy,
then co-chief of Palliative Care at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center
in New York, stated that “most physicians are reluctant to treat pain with
narcotics, fearing they will face criminal or regulatory investigations.”457
Hurwitz was one of the few physicians at the time who was willing to
prescribe large doses of narcotics to non-terminally ill pain patients. Many
of his patients “spoke of living in agony before finding pain relief from
narcotics.”458 But the evidence is more than anecdotal. Several studies
have confirmed the chilling impact of potential legal sanctions for
prescribing of narcotics for pain treatment.459
The DEA argues that because the number of DEA registrants has
increased each year since 1999, the agency’s increased scrutiny of
physicians for opioid prescribing has not caused a chilling effect.460
However, while many physicians are registered to prescribe scheduled
drugs, pain treatment advocates argue that many of them do not prescribe
scheduled drugs, or do not prescribe them on a long-term basis, and the
burden of prescribing opioids for chronic pain patients falls primarily on
approximately 4,000–6,000 physicians who specialize in pain

455. Id.
456. Drug Reform Coordination Network, supra note 107.
457. Peter Finn, D.C. Internist’s Case Spurs Concerns Over Prescribed Narcotics, WASH.
POST, June 18, 1996, at D3.
458. Id.
459. See, e.g., Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the
Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319, 320 (1996); Sharon M. Weinstein et al.,
Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Pain and the Use of Opioid Analgesics: Results of a Survey from
the Texas Cancer Pain Initiative, 93 S. MED. J. 479 (2000).
460. See News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., supra note 445 (“Since FY 1999
the DEA registrant population has continually increased reaching almost 1 million doctors (as
of June 30, 2003). During this same time, DEA has pursued sanctions on less than one tenth
of one percent of the registered doctors.”).
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management.461 Professor Ronald Libby has argued that in many states a
very small number of physicians prescribe a large volume of opioids.462
According to some, few enough physicians in the country are willing to
prescribe narcotics for chronic pain that patients might travel hundreds of
One physician used the term “the Painful
miles to see them.463
Underground Railroad” to describe the system now in play for patients with
chronic pain to find physicians who will treat them.464 Others have labeled
doctors’ fear of prescribing medications for their patient’s pain as
“opiophobia.”465 News stories have reported that some doctors display
signs in their offices that say ‘Don’t ask for OxyContin’ or ‘No OxyContin
prescribed here’ and that medical schools are advising “students not to
choose pain management as a career because the field is too fraught with
potential legal dangers.”466
To fully understand the costs of overreaching, one must also consider
the costs of untreated pain for patients unable to find a physician who will
treat their pain. For example, when Dr. Frank Fisher was arrested, many of
his patients were unable to find care.467 According to one news account,
hundreds of his patients “deteriorated unnecessarily, and several . . .
died.”468 At the time of his arrest, “twenty-five people who had been
working, with Dr. Fisher’s help, were forced to apply for full disability.”469
The American Academy of Pain Management estimates that “about 50
million Americans live with chronic pain, caused by cancer, other diseases
461. See Otesa Middleton, FDA Panel: OxyContin’s Approval Shouldn’t Be Limited, DOW
JONES NEWSWIRES, Sept. 9, 2003 (statement of Dr. J. David Haddox, Purdue Pharma); Libby,
supra note 14, at 2 (estimating the number of physicians who specialize in the treatment of
chronic pain as between 4,278 and 5,869).
462. See Libby, supra note 301 (“One percent of the physicians in Florida were
responsible for prescribing large doses of OxyContin and other narcotics. If Florida is
representative of the country, that means that only one percent of the 963,385 physicians are
responsible for treating between 30 and 80 million chronic and cancer patients in the
country.”); see also Fred Schulte, Drugging the Poor; Deaths Mount as Doctors, Pharmacists
and Patients Abuse the Medicaid System, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 30, 2003,
at 1A (stating that based on the newspaper’s own records review, sixteen doctors in Florida
had each ordered more than $1 million in opiates during the “past three years,” compared to
only 574 out of the 56,926 medical professionals in Florida who had ordered more than
$100,000 in pharmacy billings during that same time).
463. Sullum, supra note 104, at 23.
464. Id. (quoting Dr. Harvey L. Rose, a Carmichael, California, family practitioner who
battled state regulators accusing him of excessive prescribing).
465. Id.; see also Morgan, supra note 272 (discussing physician phobia of prescribing
opioids that results from misconceptions about drug use and abuse).
466. Owen, supra note 199, at 42.
467. DRUG WAR CHRON., supra note 52.
468. Id.
469. Id.
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and disorders, and accidents [and that] [a]nother 25 million live with acute
pain caused by surgery or accidents.”470 Moreover, “[t]he majority of those
with the most severe pain do not have it under control and suffer
substantially in their enjoyment of life, their social relations, and their
economic productivity.”471
Estimates of costs associated with loss of productivity due to pain have
been as high as $100 billion per year. A study published in 2003 on lost
work time and costs due to pain conditions concluded that “[p]ain is an
inordinately common and disabling condition in the US workforce,” costing
employers an “estimated $61.2 billion per year in pain-related lost
productive time.”472 But in addition to work related costs, “pain [also] has a
tremendous physiologic, sociologic, psychological and existential impact on
the individual and society;” it affects marriages, families, and friendships as
well as careers.473
Costs to individuals with untreated pain may defy quantification. Pain
patients say “[t]heir pain . . . [is] like being on fire[,] . . . like having an
electrode shoot juice up your neck all day[,] . . . like having a car parked on
your face. So intense [is] their torment . . . that suicide often seem[s] the
better alternative.”474 In some cases, before they found relief from opioid
analgesics these individuals were bedridden for years.475 Their problems
ranged from “crushed vertebrae and damaged jaws, [to] congenital bowel
inflammations and disintegrating hips, [to] terrible burns and monstrous
migraines.”476 Individuals with this type of intense and enduring pain may
also suffer depression and/or commit suicide.477 One of Dr. Hurwitz’s
patients, a forty-two-year-old resident from upstate New York, did, in fact,

470. The Infinite Mind, supra note 16; see also Kuehn, supra note 291, at 249 (citing a
2005 telephone survey of a random sample of 1204 adults which found 19% of respondents
reported chronic pain and 34% reported recurrent pain).
471. The Infinite Mind, supra note 16; see also Kuehn, supra note 291 (stating that
“[s]ome 63% of patients with pain had spoken to their physician about their pain, but only
31% reported complete relief and 21% reported little or no relief”).
472. Walter F. Stewart et al., Lost Productive Time and Cost Due to Common Pain
Conditions in the US Workforce, 290 JAMA 2443, 2443, 2449 (2003).
473. See MICHAEL DREYFUSS, OUR CHRONIC PAIN MISSION, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF PAIN
DOCS IMPEDES PAIN TREATMENT, at www.cpmission.com/main/painpolitics/impedes.html (last
visited Aug. 9, 2008) (quoting John F. Peppin, owner of the Iowa Pain Management Clinic).
474. Allen, supra note 113, at 12.
475. See id. (referring to one of Dr. Hurwitz’s patients who was bedridden for two
decades).
476. Id. at 15.
477. See id. at 12, 15 (describing the experiences of Dr. Hurwitz’s patients).
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commit suicide when Hurwitz was unable to find another physician who
would treat him.478
While there are several anecdotal reports of such deaths, no accurate
statistics of the number of individuals who take their own lives as a result of
untreated pain exist. The Pain Relief Network, however, claims that
American citizens “by the thousands are being forced into suicide by
untreated pain.”479
b. The Benefits of Overreaching
In an evenhanded policy analysis, the benefits of overreaching must also
be described. These benefits may include preventing drug addiction and
diversion. Harms associated with addiction include decline of the addict’s
physical health and productivity, financial and emotional harm to the
addict’s family, increased crime when addicts steal or commit prostitution to
maintain their habit, and even death due to drug overdose. It is difficult to
determine, however, the extent of harm that results when physicians
inadvertently prescribe narcotics to an addict or to someone who sells them
to an addict. To the extent that the physician is “feeding the addict’s habit,”
he may be worsening the addict’s health and allowing him or her to
continue living in an unproductive way. This result assumes, however, that
the addict would have otherwise sought treatment or that by the physician
refusing the addict drugs, he or she would be more likely to seek treatment.
Moreover, it is unclear whether one can attribute an increase in crime to
a physician giving an addict a narcotic when it is more likely that the addict
would not have to steal or prostitute him or herself to obtain the narcotic he
or she seeks. On the other hand, a physician could increase the circulation
of narcotics in the “market” by prescribing to a patient who subsequently
diverts the drugs, selling them illegally to addicts or other abusers.
According to one source, some jurisdictions have reported “as much as a

478. Drug Reform Coordination Network, supra note 107 (“[The] patient had been seeing
Dr. Hurwitz for three years for back and neck pain due to injuries sustained in an auto
accident. His pharmacy refused to fill Dr. Hurwitz’s District of Columbia prescriptions after
learning of the Virginia medical board’s disciplinary action against him, despite his having
been on a stable regimen for over a year. With the help of a member of the AMA Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Dr. Hurwitz was able to make arrangements for the patient to be
treated at a clinic in New Jersey and flown there for free. The patient had run out of his
medications, however, and didn’t feel he could make the trip without them. No local clinic
was willing to provide him with a short-term prescription. In the meantime, a SWAT team of
the local police, having been notified of a possible suicide, surrounded his house. The
patient, a former policeman himself, proceeded to take his own life.”).
479. James L. Schaller, Why Are Kind, Ethical & Caring Physicians Treating Your Pain
Being Targeted by Tax-Funded Government?, at www.personalconsult.com/articles/
painreliefnetwork.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2008).
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75% increase in property and other crimes that they specifically attribute to
the abuse of OxyContin.”480
Numerous news stories describe cases of pain patients who have
become “addicted” to their pain medication; however, it is not clear whether
these patients are truly addicted or are, instead, physically dependent.
According to pain treatment experts, “patients treated with prolonged opioid
therapy usually do develop physical dependence and sometimes develop
tolerance, but do not usually develop addictive disorders. . . . Addiction,
unlike tolerance and physical dependence, is not a predictable drug effect,
but represents an idiosyncratic adverse reaction in biologically and
psychosocially vulnerable individuals.”481
Overreaching may also save some lives because it may prevent a
patient or someone to whom a patient sells or gives a prescription or drug
from overdosing. Estimates of the number of overdose deaths due to
OxyContin differ. Various sources report between 146 and 500 deaths
from OxyContin overdose in 2000 and 2001.482 Yet, it is uncertain that
OxyContin was the primary cause of death as the subjects often had
consumed alcohol or other drugs in addition to oxycodone. An article in
the Journal of Analytical Toxicology found only twelve cases in one year “in
which OxyContin was the sole cause of death; all the others fell victim to
poly-drug abuse—mixing OxyContin with cocaine, alcohol, Valium, or
various other substances.”483 Thus, attributing these deaths to inappropriate
physician prescribing would seem unjustified; although, perhaps they would
have been prevented (in a lengthy backward looking “but for” causation
analysis) if the physician had not prescribed the drug at all.
Others have made the point that even if these deaths could have been
prevented, the total deaths attributable “to OxyContin over a period of two
years represent just one-third of the deaths linked to acetaminophen in a

480. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 10.
481. DEFINITIONS RELATED TO THE USE OF OPIOIDS, supra note 304; see also text
accompanying notes 304-308.
482. See Ammann, supra note 198, at 32 (citing the DEA figure of 146 deaths involving
OxyContin over a two-year period); OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN., DRUGS AND CHEMICALS OF CONCERN: SUMMARY OF MEDICAL EXAMINER REPORTS ON
OXYCODONE-RELATED DEATHS, at www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs_concern/oxycodone/
oxycontin7.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (stating that for 2000 and 2001, “146 deaths were
categorized as ‘OxyContin verified’ deaths; 318 deaths were re-categorized as ‘OxyContin
likely’”); see also Owen, supra note 199, at 44 (stating that “[f]ederal officials claim that
nearly 500 people died from overdosing on OxyContin in 2002”).
483. Owen, supra note 199, at 44 (citing Edward J. Cone et al., Oxycodone Involvement
in Drug Abuse Deaths: A DAWN-Based Classification Scheme Applied to an Oxycodone
Postmortem Database Containing Over 1000 Cases, 27 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 57
(2003)).
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single year.”484 While many more people take acetaminophen than
OxyContin, the comparison illustrates that in many other areas we tolerate
increased risk and adverse side effects because they are overshadowed by
the therapeutic benefit the drug provides and raises questions about why we
treat opioids differently. In both cases, the deaths may be intentional or
accidental. The difference appears to be the possibility of addiction to the
opioids.
In sum, in order to truly understand the costs and benefits of
overreaching by prosecutors, we need some idea of (1) the numbers of
individuals likely denied pain relief because of the arrest and prosecution of
physicians for prescribing opioids related to pain treatment and (2) the
number of individuals who become addicted or maintain an addiction
because a physician intentionally or unintentionally gives a patient an opioid
prescription. Although exact numbers are not currently available, the
number of individuals with untreated pain is orders of magnitude greater
than those who become addicted to opioids, whether as a result of receiving
a legitimate prescription or receiving the drug through illegitimate channels.
Weinman cites the difference at “‘56 million persons in pain” versus “2.6
million abusers.’”485
Lastly, as a policy matter, we must ask whether the law enforcement
strategy of targeting physicians is the most effective means of reducing
narcotic abuse and addiction. The government’s decision to target
physicians in their war on prescription drug abuse seems inherently
misguided. The most common means of opioid drug diversion have been
described by DEA as “fraudulent prescriptions, doctor shopping, overprescribing, and pharmacy theft.”486 Physicians are arguably responsible
only for “over-prescribing,” and it is debatable how much over-prescribing is
actually taking place and whether this is the source of most opiate drug
diversion. For example, individuals may obtain some drugs, including
opioids, illegally over the Internet.487

484. Ammann, supra note 198, at 32; see also Weinman, supra note 441, at 502 (stating
that the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) ranked oxycodone hydrochloride (the
substance in OxyContin) seventeenth in the first half of 2000 “on the list of drugs responsible
for drug-related visits to hospital emergency departments”; however, both aspirin (ranked
tenth) and ibuprofen (ranked eleventh) “were responsible for more emergency department
visits than OxyContin”).
485. Weinman, supra note 441, at 503 (quoting Debra E. Heidrich, Controlled-Release
Oxycodone Hydrochloride (OxyContin), 15 CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALIST 207, 208 (2001)).
486. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 10.
487. Office of Diversion Control, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Question & Answers:
Dispensing
and
Purchasing
Controlled
Substances
over
the
Internet,
at
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/internetpurch.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (“The DEA
recognizes that while some Internet sites facilitate legitimate prescribing and dispensing
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2. Deontologic Arguments
A practice which is likely to increase the number of individuals treated
for chronic pain, even if it also results in a small increase in the number of
individuals who become addicts or continue addictive behaviors (i.e.,
underreaching), can also be defended on deontological (moral) grounds.
While moral arguments have largely been the mainstay of those arguing for
stricter drug enforcement practices, those arguments may be trumped by
higher moral values. Those who espouse stricter drug enforcement
practices (i.e., overreaching) believe that addiction is morally repugnant and
leads to immoral behavior, e.g., theft and prostitution, separate and apart
from the economic or physical harms associated with these behaviors.488
This moral reprehensibility, they would argue, requires that we prevent such
behavior at all costs (or without regard to cost). In order to bolster their
arguments, those with this view have often exaggerated both the number of
addicts in this country and the crimes caused by addicts.489 In the context of
pain patients, those arguing for stricter enforcement of drug laws believe
that pain patients treated with opioids are highly likely to become addicted,
which they believe is morally reprehensible. However, it is equally
reprehensible to fail to treat a patient’s pain.
Arguably, there is a moral imperative to treat pain that rises to the level
of a human rights issue. The AMA has pronounced that “[p]hysicians have
an obligation to relieve pain and suffering and to promote the dignity and
autonomy of dying patients in their care[, including] providing effective
palliative treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten death.”490 Also,
“[i]n 1997, the American Society of Addiction Medicine affirmed that
physicians are obligated to relieve pain and suffering in their patients,
including those with concurrent addictive disorders.”491 Linda Farber Post
and her colleagues wrote of the moral imperative to treat pain, stating that

practices, other sites facilitate the illegal sale of controlled substances. These sites of illicit
activity enable some consumers to illegally purchase controlled substances without realizing
they are committing a crime.”).
488. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 244 (describing the belief of historical proponents of
strict narcotics controls that “the need for money to buy drugs or a direct physiological
incitement to violence led to crime and immoral behavior”).
489. See id. at 246 (“Like the speculated percentage of crimes caused by narcotic use and
sales, the number of addicts estimated for the nation appears often to have been
exaggerated.”).
490. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES, H-140.966:
DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE, at www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&
doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-140.966.HTM (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
491. Hurwitz, supra note 272, at 13 (citing Rights and Responsibilities of Physicians in the
Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Pain (adopted by the Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med. Bd. of
Dirs., Apr. 16, 1997)).
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the physician’s “obligation of beneficence requires physicians to do good
and prevent harm” and that the list of goods typically includes “prolongation
of life, restoration of function, and relief of pain and suffering.”492 The
authors refer to the physician’s obligation to treat pain as “what moral
philosophers call a prima facie or conditional obligation, something
physicians ought to do unless some other duty or moral consideration takes
precedence.”493 Some other duty might take precedence, for example,
when a patient refuses pain medication out of concern that it may affect his
or her intellectual awareness.494 In order to respect the patient’s autonomy,
a physician, under these circumstances, could ethically decline to treat a
patient’s pain. However, when a patient requests pain relief both ethical
principles of autonomy and beneficence merge to support an ethical
obligation to treat the patient’s pain.
An additional ethical argument against overreaching is the impact that it
has on the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors, as an initial matter, must
develop a trusting relationship with their patients, which requires them to
listen to their patients and believe their accounts of their symptoms. As
stated above, this is especially true in the field of pain management where
there is no objective test for pain. Neither is there a wholly accurate test to
determine whether the patient is telling the truth or fabricating his
symptoms.495 Physicians who ignore their patient’s pain accounts would be
arguably negligent.496 Prosecutors and the DEA argue that “doctors violate
the law when they prescribe pain pills to patients who they know—or
reasonably should know—are selling or abusing the drugs.”497 But, this
puts physicians in the position of being watch dogs for law enforcement or,
at least, suspicious of their patients’ claims of pain. It compromises the
doctor-patient relationship. Moreover, it seems wholly inappropriate as a
test for criminal liability when the doctor faces legal risk for undertreating as
well as overtreating pain. William Hurwitz has argued that holding
physicians responsible for their patients’ misbehavior puts doctors in a no

492. Linda Farber Post et al., Pain: Ethics, Culture, and Informed Consent to Relief, 24 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 348, 349 (1996).
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. See Hurwitz, supra note 272, at 14 (“Physicians usually can screen out the wholly
fraudulent patient without a pain syndrome at all, but current medical technology includes
neither a pain ‘meter’ nor other objective test to ensure against other forms of deception or
medication misuse by patients.”).
496. See Ben A. Rich, Op-Ed, Physicians’ Legal Duty to Relieve Suffering, 175 W.J. MED.
151, 152 (2001) (discussing the jury verdict against a doctor for undertreating his elderly
patient’s pain, in Bergman v. Wing Chin, MD & Eden Med. Ctr., No. H205732-1 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1999).
497. Vartabedian, supra note 202.
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win situation: “It forces doctors who try to treat pain to act like police,
reinforcing a perverse medical paternalism that subverts the ethical
imperatives designed to protect patient autonomy and dignity. This
distortion of the patient-physician relationship stigmatizes patients and
erodes their trust.”498
Many physicians who work in pain clinics or who treat chronic pain
patients already engage in highly intrusive behaviors in an effort to ensure
that their patients are not drug addicts or diverters. In fact, “[p]ain
specialists—usually psychiatrists, anesthesiologists or neurosurgeons—often
operate within the structure of large clinics that run patients through a
gantlet [sic] of rehabilitation techniques, starting with the removal of all
medications.”499 Then, “[o]nce patients do get narcotics, they must follow
stringent rules to prevent abuse or diversion of the drugs.”500 As an
example, the Community Health Projects Medical Group in California,
which provides opioid therapy at thirty-five clinics, requires each patient to
sign a thirty-six-page consent form.501 “[T]he form warns patients that in
exchange for a maximum of 32 pills a day, they must follow scores of rules
for behavior inside and outside the clinic, and can be dropped instantly and
without recourse.”502 Pain clinics routinely ration pills, test urine “each visit
to make sure the patient is using the medication, not selling it,” and require
that patients “visit once or twice a month.”503

498. Hurwitz, supra note 272, at 14.
499. Allen, supra note 113, at 15.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id. Individual pain treatment practitioners may impose additional requirements. See
Walter A. Brown, Finessing the Fine Line Between Pain Management and Opioid Addiction, 3
APPLIED NEUROLOGY 39, 40 (2007), available at http://appneurology.com/showArticle.jhtml
?articleId=197003317 (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (describing a neurologist with a practice
focused primarily on pain management who “carries out unannounced pill counts and urine
screens in all his patients who have NCP [nonmalignant chronic pain]. For the pill counts, he
periodically calls each patient and tells them to get to a pharmacy within 2 hours and bring all
their pills for the pharmacist to count. He also periodically calls each patient and tells them to
go to a nearby hospital or laboratory within 2 hours for a urine screen. He doesn’t do these
counts or urine screens during office visits because that is when patients expect them.”).
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IX. AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD
A.

Moving away from a Criminal Approach

The substantial overlap between the current criminal standard set forth
in the CSA and its implementing regulations and the civil malpractice
standard calls for an alternative criminal basis for prosecution. The current
standard appears to require a knowing violation, i.e., knowledge by the
physician that he is prescribing outside the bounds of professional practice
and not for a “legitimate medical purpose.”504 Yet, actual knowledge is not
required in practice; rather, courts permit a willful blindness standard that, in
effect, allows a “jury to convict based on an ex post facto ‘he should have
been more careful’ theory or to convict on mere negligence (‘the defendant
should have known his conduct was illegal’).”505 Whether the willful
blindness instruction is based on a subjective or objective test can also skew
the results, with an objective test pushing jurors towards a negligence
standard.506 An objective willful blindness test coupled with an objective
good faith defense further narrows the gap between a mens rea requirement
based on knowledge versus one based on negligence.507
When there is no indication of intent to do harm or proof of knowledge
of wrongdoing, the criminal justice system also allows for prosecution when
one acts “recklessly” or “negligently.”508 According to the Model Penal
Code,
[a] person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that . . . exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.509

The definition of criminal negligence is similar. However, rather than
“consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk,” the
individual fails to perceive the risk when he should have been aware of it.510
The risk which the actor either consciously disregards or fails to perceive
must be both “substantial and unjustifiable.”511 Commentary to the Code

504. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2007).
505. O’SULLIVAN, supra note 340, at 101 (quoting United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836
(4th Cir. 1994)).
506. See id. at 102.
507. See id. at 101-02.
508. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
509. Id. § 2.02(2)(c) (emphasis added).
510. Id. § 2.02(2)(c-d).
511. Id. § 2.02(2)(d) (emphasis added).
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states that “[e]ven substantial risks . . . may be created without recklessness
when the actor is seeking to serve a proper purpose, as when a surgeon
performs an operation that he knows is very likely to be fatal but reasonably
thinks to be necessary because the patient has no other, safer chance.”512
In cases of opioid prescribing, it would seem that the inquiry regarding
recklessness or criminal negligence would focus on the risk of prescribing,
including not only potential overdose and addiction, but also diversion.
However, with the prescribing of any narcotic, there is a risk that the drug
may be abused or diverted. Yet, the physician must weigh that risk against
the real need of the patient for pain relief. Because a physician attempting
to treat a patient for pain will virtually always have a justification for such
risk, these lower standards are inherently unworkable. As a result, I argue
for a higher criminal standard that would help to clearly separate negligent
or reckless behavior, which can be more appropriately dealt with in the civil
justice system, from criminal behavior. Such a standard would require that
the physician had knowingly or intentionally513 prescribed a controlled
substance for a non medical purpose or a purpose not authorized by law
and that the physician received a tangible benefit (in excess of ordinary fees)
for his prescribing.514 In order to prevent the knowing standard from
crossing into a reckless or negligence test, a willful blindness instruction
would not be permitted.
In the cases that have gone to court, prosecutors have generally not
provided evidence of financial gain or other benefit on the part of the
physician, other than office fees, nor evidence of intent to divert. Frequently,
however, evidence is brought forth that “patients” lied to receive their drugs.
The proposed higher standard would change the nature of the evidence and
expert testimony required for successful prosecution from one where
physicians are called upon to testify to the defendant’s lack of conformance
with current standards of practice to one where evidence of financial gain or
other benefit is put forward to establish intent or knowledge.
This higher standard for criminal prosecution also seems appropriate in
this context when considering the goals of the criminal justice system:
specific and general deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution.515 The
current standard, i.e., prosecuting pain physicians for prescribing large
doses of opioids that seem inconsistent with legitimate medical practice,
arguably has had an excessive deterrent effect that greatly reduces the

512. MODEL PENAL CODE & Commentaries § 2.02 cmt. 3 (1985).
513. The Model Penal Code defines four kinds of culpability that may serve to establish
criminal conduct: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2) (1962).
514. Hoffmann, supra note 392.
515. Id.
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number of physicians willing to treat chronic pain patients.516 Moreover,
incapacitation—through incarceration—is unnecessary to keep suspect
physicians from doing harm, as the Attorney General can revoke their DEA
registration and the state medical board can revoke or suspend their license
to practice.517
In determining whether to revoke registration from a practitioner, the
Attorney General must determine whether such registration is “inconsistent
with the public interest.”518 In determining the public interest, the Attorney
General considers, among other factors, whether the applicant has
maintained “effective controls against diversion of . . . controlled
substances.”519
Finally, retribution does not seem appropriate when there is some
evidence of prescribing for a legally authorized purpose and when there are
other means, besides criminal prosecution, to deal with physicians who are
dangerous or incompetent in their prescribing.520 Along with registration or
licensure revocation, “physicians who prescribe in a manner that is below a
professional ‘standard of care,’ and that harms a patient or third party to
whom the physician owes a duty, should be liable for civil negligence.”521
Such interventions are arguably better suited to prescribing for chronic pain
patients, where physicians are required to make “tough judgment calls.”522
B.

A Greater Role for State Medical Boards

While a higher standard for criminal liability will benefit physicians
treating chronic pain patients (and their patients), such a higher standard
should be accompanied by more aggressive action on the part of state
medical boards to weed out physicians who are engaging in prescribing
practices that are unsafe, inappropriate, or inconsistent with prevailing
standards of care.
State medical boards are certainly better equipped to determine whether
the volume and dosages of opioids prescribed for a patient are consistent
with acceptable medical practice than are federal and state prosecutors.
Moreover, state medical boards have taken action in numerous cases where

516. Id.
517. Id.; see also Diane E. Hoffmann, Can State Medical Boards Adequately Respond to
Reports that Physicians Are Inappropriately Prescribing Opioids?, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY
& THERAPEUTICS 799, 800 (2007) (discussing the option of having state medical boards handle
these cases instead of prosecutors).
518. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2000).
519. Id. § 823(b)(1).
520. Hoffmann, supra note 392.
521. Id.
522. Id.
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physicians have improperly prescribed opioids.523 Although boards were
criticized for overaggressive actions against physicians for prescribing
opioids in the late 1980s and early 1990s,524 more recent studies indicate
that state boards, consistent with guidelines published by the Federation of
State Medical Boards,525 have tempered their actions against physicians for
prescribing high dosages of opioids and “have made significant progress in
adjusting their requirements for disciplinary actions to better reflect emerging
standards of care for pain treatment.”526
While state medical boards are more likely to have the institutional
competency to assess inappropriate prescribing, they also have
shortcomings that may limit their effectiveness as a primary enforcer with
regard to disciplinary action or other sanctions against physicians for
inappropriate prescribing. As currently constituted, state boards are often
underfunded and understaffed and, as a result, not sufficiently aggressive in
pursuing physician wrongdoing. Moreover, resource constraints can result
in delays in investigation, charging, and license revocation.527 While state
medical boards, “with evidence that a physician’s medical practice presents
a threat to public health and safety . . . have the ability to issue a summary
suspension under which a physician’s license can be suspended
immediately, this option is seldom used.”528
If we were to rely on state medical boards to take a more active role in
disciplining physicians in light of a higher criminal standard for arrest and
prosecution of physicians for opioid presribing, additional resources would
need to be allocated to this function and structural mechanisms put in place
to allow boards to “fast track” these cases.529 A separate review committee,
including experts in pain management, would help ensure that more
accurate decisions are made and that, when appropriate, summary

523. See Hoffmann, supra note 517, at 799.
524. See, e.g., Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380, 1385 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996), in which the Florida Court of Appeals referred to the Florida Medical
Board’s “policing [of] pain prescription practice[s]” as a “draconian policy.”
525. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., supra note 281; see also Hoffmann, supra
note 517, at 800 (“These guidelines, adopted by many states, make clear that fostering
effective pain relief is a goal of the regulatory process, [and] that physician prescribing will not
be
judged by volume or duration of prescribing alone but instead by patient outcomes . . . .”).
526. Hoffmann, supra note 517, at 800; see also id. (concluding, based on a 2002 survey
of state medical boards, “that boards seem to be moving away from volume or quantity as a
primary basis for investigating a physician for overprescribing opioids and are looking more to
compliance with established guidelines for appropriate prescribing as the basis for
investigation and discipline”).
527. Id.
528. Id. at 800-01 (footnote omitted).
529. Id. at 801.
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suspension and disciplinary action would accompany unsafe or incompetent
prescribing practices.
X. CONCLUSION
Recent arrests and prosecutions of physicians for prescribing opioids
used to treat pain under section 841(a) of the Controlled Substances Act
have had a chilling effect on physicians’ willingness to treat pain. The fear
on the part of physicians is, in large part, based on the uncertainty
surrounding the criminal standard and the inability of the DEA and law
enforcement agents to clearly articulate practices that are outside the
bounds of professional practice. The current standard, i.e., prescribing
outside the bounds of professional practice or for other than a legitimate
medical purpose, is vague and does not adequately draw the line between
what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable conduct. Moreover, the
difference between the CSA’s criminal standard and a civil malpractice
standard is not intuitively obvious and has confused jurors.
The law creates a further barrier to physician willingness to treat chronic
pain patients by virtue of the fact that failure to treat and undertreating pain
can result in malpractice liability and disciplinary action by state medical
boards. These factors collude, resulting in significant undertreatment of
patients with chronic pain.
Thus, the current standard inappropriately calibrates the balance
between the dual goals of treating pain and reducing drug abuse and
diversion and needs to be recalibrated. This recalibration calls for a change
in the criminal standard to one that requires a showing of purposeful or
knowing action on the part of a physician. While some may argue that this
standard tips the scales too far in the other direction, such an overcorrection
is arguably warranted. The result may mean that more individuals will be
able to obtain opioids for their own use or for sale to others, but it will also
mean that more individuals will be rescued from the agony of their
untreated pain.
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